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DISFAVORED CONSTITUTION, PASSIVE 
VIRTUES?  LINKING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
FISCAL LIMITATIONS AND PERMISSIVE 
TAXPAYER STANDING DOCTRINES 
Joshua G. Urquhart* 
 
This Article contrasts the permissive state taxpayer standing doctrines in 
place in most states with the restrictive federal and state taxpayer standing 
rules applied in federal court.  It proposes a new theory to explain this 
disparity, arguing that ubiquitous state constitutional fiscal restrictions, 
which specifically limit a state government’s ability to tax, spend, and 
borrow, are a primary impetus in the creation and development of liberal 
state taxpayer standing doctrines.  The Article evaluates this novel 
hypothesis through an empirical-historical survey of the early state 
taxpayer standing decisions in every permissive jurisdiction and finds that 
these provisions are indeed involved in most cases and in most states.  It 
concludes by discussing the implications of these results. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Texas Governor Oscar Branch Colquitt started submitting invoices to the 
state comptroller for various sundry expenses in June 1914.1  They included 
charges for gas, ice, telephones, automobile repairs, coal, waiter services, 
eggs, bread, and other groceries.2  The state legislature appropriated funds 
to pay the bills on February 11, 1915.3  Texas State Representative W.C. 
Middleton filed a lawsuit against the Texas state comptroller, seeking to 
enjoin the appropriation.4  He argued that it violated article IV, section 5 of 
the Texas Constitution, which at the time limited the governor’s 
compensation to an annual salary of $4,000.5  Middleton contended that the 
appropriation caused the governor to exceed this cap, and thus it constituted 
an unlawful expenditure of state taxpayer dollars.6 
The trial court agreed.  It issued a temporary injunction on June 12, 
1915,7 barring the comptroller from paying bills submitted by a hotel, book 
store, two grocers, a butcher, and two other creditors.8  These bills totaled 
approximately $400 and included a $90 charge from the Driskill Hotel in 
 
 1. See Terrell v. Middleton, 187 S.W. 367, 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Martha Sue Parr, Chicken Salad Case, HANDBOOK TEX. ONLINE, http://www.
tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/jrc01 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
 5. See TEX. CONST. art. 4, § 5 (1876). 
 6. See Terrell, 187 S.W. at 368. 
 7. See Parr, supra note 4. 
 8. Terrell, 187 S.W. at 368. 
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Austin for fifteen gallons of chicken salad.9  The court entered a permanent 
injunction after a bench trial, and the state comptroller appealed.10 
The comptroller’s first argument on appeal effectively was that 
Middleton lacked standing to pursue the state constitutional claims.11  He 
contended that the “pleadings affirmatively show that [Middleton] has no 
interest in the suit other than as a citizen and as a taxpayer in general with 
other citizens and other taxpayers.”12  The appellate court rejected this 
argument.  It noted that Middleton was seeking to enjoin the illegal 
expenditure of taxes collected by the state, a portion of which he paid 
himself.13  The court compared such unlawful spending to the illegal 
collection of taxes and opined that because both effectively increased the 
tax burden, any affected taxpayer could challenge them.14  It proceeded to 
the merits, holding that appropriations for fuel, water, lights, and ice were 
necessary to maintain the governor’s mansion, but the groceries and other 
personal expenses constituted excess compensation in violation of the 
Texas Constitution.15  The court acknowledged that the antiquated 
compensation limit was insufficient, but especially in light of previous 
failed attempts to amend the state constitution to raise it, there was no 
choice but to respect the provision.16 
The comptroller appealed this decision to the Texas Supreme Court, 
which denied the writ of error in a per curiam opinion on February 20, 
1917.17  It similarly denied the motion for rehearing on March 28, 1917.18  
By this time, Colquitt had been replaced in office, but his successor, James 
“Pa” Ferguson, continued the practice of purchasing personal items with 
state funds.19  He apparently promised to repay the state in the case of an 
unfavorable court outcome in sworn testimony before the Texas Senate, but 
that reimbursement never occurred.20  Ferguson was impeached, convicted, 
and removed from office for misappropriating state funds in August and 
 
 9. Id. at 368–69. 
 10. Id. 
 11. The decision does not mention the term “standing,” which generally was not 
employed by courts in 1916.  Indeed, it was not even coined by the U.S. Supreme Court until 
its 1944 decision, Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 302 (1944). See James Leonard & Joanne 
C. Brant, The Half-Open Door:  Article III, the Injury-in-Fact Rule, and the Framers’ Plan 
for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2001).  However, 
despite the fact that decisions from the early twentieth century (like Terrell) do not use this 
modern-day terminology, commentators often consider them to be the first true “standing” 
decisions. See infra Part I.A (discussing early federal standing jurisprudence); see also 
Calvert v. Hull, 475 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1972) (discussing early Texas standing 
jurisprudence). 
 12. Terrell, 187 S.W. at 369. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 372–73. 
 16. Id. at 371. 
 17. See Terrell v. Middleton, 191 S.W. 1138 (Tex. 1917). 
 18. See Terrell v. Middleton, 193 S.W. 139 (Tex. 1917). 
 19. See generally Parr, supra note 4. 
 20. See id. 
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September of 1917.21  The bills for personal expenses thus cost one 
governor his job. 
Terrell v. Middleton, or the “Chicken Salad Case” as it is known in Texas 
political lore,22 is notable for reasons apart from its curious fact pattern and 
its sensational aftermath.  The decision and its progeny have been cited 
repeatedly throughout the ensuing decades for the now-uncontroversial 
proposition that Texas taxpayers will have standing to challenge unlawful 
state government expenditures.23  If one were to trace modern Texas state 
taxpayer standing jurisprudence back to a progenitor case, this would be it. 
The result in Terrell may be surprising to commentators, practitioners, 
and students alike who are more familiar with the concept of taxpayer 
standing under federal justiciability principles.  Most learn in law school 
that the rules are different in federal court.  Federal taxpayers there 
generally cannot challenge unlawful or illegal government expenditures 
absent some unique, particularized injury, with one notable exception.24  
Nor does this change if one claims standing as a state (and not federal) 
taxpayer; recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions are clear that this type of 
plaintiff also lacks standing.25 
But Texas courts are not federal courts, and they are free to open their 
doors to taxpayers challenging unlawful or illegal state expenditures if they 
wish.26  And they have.  Texas is not unusual in this regard.  The majority 
of other jurisdictions—though by no means all of them, as commentators 
sometimes claim—likewise allow state taxpayer lawsuits, and many have 
 
 21. Id.; Ralph W. Steen, Ferguson, James Edward (1871–1944), HANDBOOK TEX. 
ONLINE, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/ffe05 (last visited Nov. 16, 
2012).  This was not the end of Ferguson’s political career.  He unsuccessfully campaigned 
for Texas Governor in 1918, President (as an independent) in 1920, and U.S. Senator in 
1922. See id.  His wife, Miriam “Ma” Ferguson, was a better politician.  She twice was 
elected Texas Governor, in 1924 and 1932. See John D. Huddleston, Ferguson, Miriam 
Amanda Wallace [Ma] (1875-1961), HANDBOOK TEX. ONLINE, http://www.tshaonline.org/
handbook/online/articles/ffe06 (last visited Nov. 16, 2012). 
 22. See Calvert v. Hull, 475 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1972); see also Parr, supra note 4. 
 23. See, e.g., Calvert, 475 S.W.2d at 908; Hendee v. Dewhurst, 228 S.W.3d 354, 378 
(Tex. Ct. App. 2007); Tex. Indus. Traffic League v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 628 S.W.2d 187, 
193 (Tex. App. 1982); Johnson v. Ferguson, 55 S.W.2d 153, 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); 
Sherman v. Cage, 279 S.W. 508, 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); see also Williams v. Lara, 52 
S.W.3d 171, 178–79 (Tex. 2001) (summarizing Texas taxpayer standing law); Comment, 
Taxpayers’ Suits:  A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895, 900 n.30 (1960) [hereinafter 
Comment, Taxpayers’ Suits] (citing Terrell for the proposition that Texas taxpayers can sue 
to enjoin an unlawful expenditure). 
 24. See, e.g., 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531.10.1 (3d ed. 2008) (“[A] workably clear 
description can be provided as to federal taxpayer standing to challenge federal programs—
standing is allowed only in a narrow range of Establishment Clause cases, and might yet be 
limited even further.”). 
 25. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 353–54 (2006) (no state taxpayer 
standing to challenge Ohio tax credits); see also Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 
131 S. Ct. 1436, 1449 (2011) (no state taxpayer standing to challenge Arizona tax credits). 
 26. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[T]he constraints of 
Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the 
limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability . . . .”). 
 2012] DISFAVORED CONSTITUTION, PASSIVE VIRTUES? 1267 
for decades.27  In other words, among American court systems, the federal 
rule is in the distinct minority.  The question is why.  Why have federal 
courts evolved so dissimilarly from their state counterparts? 
That state courts grant taxpayers much broader standing than federal 
courts to challenge unlawful state expenditures is not a new observation; 
commentators have long acknowledged the disparity.28  Yet none have ever 
provided a convincing explanation for it.  This Article fills in that gap.  It 
proposes that permissive state taxpayer standing doctrines are closely linked 
to a ubiquitous type of state constitutional provision that is conspicuously 
absent from the U.S. Constitution—namely, constitutional fiscal limitations 
that specifically restrict states’ taxing, spending, and borrowing powers.  
These state constitutional fiscal restrictions, which are intended to protect 
the class of taxpayers as a whole, normally are unenforceable under 
traditional injury-based standing rules.  This Article argues that state 
taxpayer standing rules have evolved accordingly to give the provisions 
judicially enforceable teeth. 
That thesis should make a great deal of sense.  If the intended 
beneficiaries of a state constitutional fiscal limitation would not have 
standing to sue to enforce its provisions, then it is hard to see who would.29  
The proposed link explains, for example, why the Texas appellate court 
would allow a state taxpayer to challenge the “chicken salad” appropriation.  
No one else would be injured by a violation of a constitutional 
gubernatorial salary cap at issue, at least in any practical sense.  When a 
governor is paid more than he or she is constitutionally permitted, only the 
taxpayers are harmed, albeit in an abstract and indirect way.  It should not 
be surprising that courts might let them sue. 
This Article also ties together two notable strands of contemporary legal 
scholarship.  The first, originally proposed by Professor Helen Hershkoff, 
suggests that distinct features of state constitutionalism can be an important 
driving force behind state justiciability doctrines, including, most notably, 
 
 27. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 28. See infra Part II.B (discussing academic commentary on state taxpayer standing).  
For example, in 1960, the Yale Law Journal published an extensive—and still-cited—survey 
of the taxpayer standing rules in all fifty states. See generally Comment, Taxpayers’ Suits, 
supra note 23. 
 29. Indeed, state courts have long offered this rationale to support their embrace of 
permissive taxpayer standing doctrines. See, e.g., Dep’t of Admin. v. Horne, 269 So. 2d 659, 
663 (Fla. 1972) (“Despite our reluctance to open the door to possible multiple suits by 
‘ordinary citizens,’ nonetheless, it is the ‘ordinary citizen’ and taxpayer who is ultimately 
affected and who is sometimes the only champion of the people in an unpopular cause.”); 
Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 9 (Me. 1983) (“[O]ther than a taxpayers’ suit, there is 
no mechanism available [to enforce the constitutional provision at issue]. . . .  It would 
conflict with the basic theory of American government if two branches of government, the 
legislative and the executive, by acting in concert were able, unchecked, to frustrate the 
mandates of the state constitution.”); Boryszewski v. Brydges, 334 N.E.2d 579, 581 (N.Y. 
1975) (“We are now prepared to recognize standing where, as in the present case, the failure 
to accord such standing would be in effect to erect an impenetrable barrier to any judicial 
scrutiny of legislative action.”); see also Zeigler v. Baker, 344 So. 2d 761, 764 (Ala. 1977) 
(same). 
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taxpayer standing rules.30  The second, made most prominent by Professor 
Richard Briffault, focuses on constitutional fiscal restrictions that limit a 
government’s ability to tax, spend, and borrow, which are a little-examined 
but important thread of state constitutionalism.31  This Article synthesizes 
and builds on these influential theories. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this Article actually tests its thesis 
through an empirical-historical survey of the early state taxpayer standing 
cases in each permissive state.  The results of the survey show that 
constitutional fiscal restrictions are indeed involved in most of these cases 
and in most states.32  In other words, insofar as this Article proposes that 
state constitutional fiscal limitations are a major impetus for the creation 
and development of permissive taxpayer standing doctrines, its empirical 
findings are entirely consistent with that hypothesis. 
Part I briefly summarizes the federal taxpayer standing rules.  Part II 
contrasts them with the far more permissive doctrines employed in most 
states.  Part III discusses various theories explaining this disparity and 
introduces the more recent scholarship examining state constitutional fiscal 
limitations.  Part IV.A fully explains this Article’s thesis that the federal-
state taxpayer standing disparity can be traced to these ubiquitous 
restrictions.  Part IV.B presents the survey of early state taxpayer standing 
cases in every permissive jurisdiction undertaken to evaluate this theory.  
Part V discusses the results. 
I.  TAXPAYER STANDING IN FEDERAL COURT 
This Part discusses the current standards of taxpayer standing in federal 
courts.  It first details the general anti–taxpayer standing principles 
(including the narrow Establishment Clause exception), and then discusses 
state taxpayers specifically. 
A.  Federal Anti–taxpayer Standing Principles Generally 
The basic issue of federal court taxpayer standing has been the subject of 
tens or even hundreds of thousands of pages of academic and judicial 
commentary over the past several decades, and it thus warrants only a brief 
summary here.33  Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits federal courts’ 
 
 30. See generally Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”:  Rethinking 
the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001). 
 31. See generally Richard Briffault, Foreword:  The Disfavored Constitution:  State 
Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907 (2003). 
 32. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 33. And yet, the subject is not any closer to being settled as a result of this voluminous 
treatment. See Ann Althouse, Standing, In Fluffy Slippers, 77 VA. L. REV. 1177, 1182 n.21 
(1991) (cataloguing criticisms); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE 
L.J. 221, 221–22 (1988) (calling standing law “incoherent” and cataloguing criticisms); 
Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 613–15 (2004) (discussing and 
cataloguing academic criticism of standing jurisprudence). 
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jurisdiction to cases and controversies brought before them.34  The Supreme 
Court has interpreted this to mean that a plaintiff must have standing—or a 
personal stake in the litigation—to bring his or her claims.35  The academic 
literature refers to these injured parties with a direct interest in the litigation 
as “Hohfeldian” plaintiffs; in contrast, scholars usually call litigants without 
an individualized interest “non-Hohfeldian” plaintiffs.36  Commentators and 
judges cite a well-rehearsed37 litany of policy reasons in support of the 
federal standing doctrine.38  It is beyond the scope of this Article to 
examine or evaluate these justifications. 
The issue of standing often arises in federal court in the context of a 
taxpayer lawsuit.  Plaintiffs in these types of cases usually seek to challenge 
purportedly unlawful government expenditures under the theory that they 
have standing because their taxes ultimately funded some small fraction of 
 
 34. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  Federal courts also apply “prudential” standing 
limitations that are “founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the 
courts in a democratic society.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).  These 
requirements preclude claims where, for example, a plaintiff’s grievance falls outside the 
zone of interests protected by the statutory or constitutional provision invoked in his or her 
lawsuit. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).  Prudential standing limitations 
can be overridden by Congress. See, e.g., Craig R. Gottlieb, Comment, How Standing Has 
Fallen:  The Need To Separate Constitutional and Prudential Concerns, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 
1063, 1066–67 (1994). 
 35. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442 (2011); 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737, 751 (1984); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, 
HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 136–55 (4th ed. 
1996) (discussing standing principles generally).  As noted above, the concept of standing 
traces back to the early twentieth century, but the term was not coined until the 1940s. 
 36. The “Hohfeldian/non-Hohfeldian” terminology is normally attributed to a 1968 
article by Professor Louis Jaffe. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen As Litigant in Public 
Actions:  The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1034–35 
(1968); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law 
Litigation:  Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 & n.12 (1984) 
(discussing the genesis of the term “Hohfeldian”). 
 37. Indeed, by 1988 one commentator dubbed the arguments “numbingly familiar.” See 
Fletcher, supra note 33, at 222. 
 38. First, standing requirements might improve judicial decision making by requiring 
litigants to be adverse parties who have a stake in the case and who will be likely to present 
their side effectively. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).  Second, the 
requirements could help ensure that the parties most affected by a controversy can litigate it. 
See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III:  Perspectives on the “Case or 
Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 311 (1979).  Third, they can prevent 
advisory opinions by courts that might not appreciate the real-world consequences of the 
case at issue. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 
1002, 1006 (1924).  Fourth, standing requirements might increase judicial efficiency by 
“filtering out” disputes that come before a court in a suboptimal form. See, e.g., Michael E. 
Solimine, Recalibrating Justiciability in Ohio Courts, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531, 533–34 
(2003).  Finally, standing requirements could advance constitutional separation of powers 
principles by ensuring that federal courts only engage in policymaking in cases involving 
actual litigants. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As an Essential Element 
of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983). 
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the illicit spending.39  Courts and commentators offer a handful of 
arguments to support the justiciabililty of these lawsuits.40  They have been 
the subject of extensive, but largely unsuccessful, federal standing-based 
litigation for nearly a century.41 
Indeed, the first modern Supreme Court standing case involved precisely 
this fact pattern.42  In Frothingham v. Mellon,43 a taxpayer brought a 
lawsuit against the Secretary of the Treasury to restrain payments to several 
states that chose to participate in a federal program intended to encourage 
cooperation between the U.S. and state governments for the purpose of 
reducing infant mortality and protecting maternal health.44  She argued that 
this program fell outside of Congress’s enumerated constitutional powers.45  
The Court declined to reach the substance of the complaint.  It disposed of 
the case for “want of jurisdiction,” holding that any increased tax burden 
would be spread across a vast and ever-changing number of taxpayers.46  
The Court was especially troubled by the possibility that  
[i]f one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other 
taxpayer may do the same, not only in respect of the statute here under 
review but also in respect of every other appropriation act and statute 
whose administration requires the outlay of public money, and whose 
validity may be questioned.47 
 
 39. See Susan L. Parsons, Comment, Taxpayers’ Suits:  Standing Barriers and 
Pecuniary Restraints, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 951, 951–52 (1986); 74 AM. JUR. 2D Taxpayers’ Actions 
§ 1 (2012).  Professor Nancy Staudt notes that the term “taxpayer lawsuit” encompasses two 
types of claims—taxpayers challenging their own tax bill and taxpayers challenging a 
government expenditure funded by their taxes.  There is no controversy about the former 
action; therefore, this Article, like its predecessors, focuses on the latter. Nancy C. Staudt, A 
Systematic Study of a (Misunderstood) Standing Doctrine, 52 EMORY L.J. 771, 776 (2003) 
(discussing taxpayer lawsuits generally). 
 40. See Parsons, supra note 39, at 953–55.  First, some courts observe that taxpayers 
must replenish the government treasury for the improperly allocated funds, and thus, they 
will suffer a pecuniary injury as a result of an unlawful expenditure. See id. at 953.  Second, 
other courts justify taxpayer lawsuits on a trust theory, viewing public officials as “trustees” 
holding the public funds at issue “in trust” for taxpayers. See id. at 953–54.  Finally, a third 
group of courts view taxpayer actions as directly analogous to shareholder derivative 
lawsuits. See id. at 54–55; see also 4 JOHN MARTINEZ, C. DALLAS SANDS & MICHAEL 
LIBONATI, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 29.7 (2011) (detailing rationales). 
 41. But see Staudt, supra note 39, at 773–74 (observing that federal courts permit 
taxpayer lawsuits more frequently than commentators assert). 
 42. The Court was confronted with a similar claim of taxpayer standing in Wilson v. 
Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907), but it declined to resolve it. Id. at 31; see also Comment, 
Taxpayers’ Suits, supra note 23, at 915 n.112. 
 43. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
 44. Id. at 479–80. 
 45. Id. at 479. 
 46. Id. at 480, 487. 
 47. Id. at 487.  More contemporary commentators argue that this view of Frothingham is 
overly simplistic, and in fact, the case should be evaluated in its proper historical context 
(i.e., it was decided only a short while after the federal courts abandoned the arcane writ 
pleading system, and much of its analysis harkens back to that regime).  See Stephen L. 
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
1371, 1444–47 (1988). 
 2012] DISFAVORED CONSTITUTION, PASSIVE VIRTUES? 1271 
The general anti–taxpayer standing principles embraced in Frothingham 
persisted throughout the next several decades.48  The Court seemed to 
abruptly reverse course in 1968, however, when it held in Flast v. Cohen49 
that a federal taxpayer had standing to challenge a federal program 
providing educational assistance to certain religious schools.50  Chief 
Justice Warren, writing for the majority, acknowledged the apparent 
inconsistency between Frothingham and Flast.  He distinguished the two 
cases by noting that, whereas the former “merely” involved a situation in 
which the federal government was alleged to exceed its delegated powers, 
the latter concerned an expenditure that purportedly violated a specific and 
express constitutional spending restriction (the Establishment Clause).51 
Justice Warren’s opinion at least nominally established a new rule 
whereby taxpayer lawsuits would be permitted when (1) the challenged 
expenditure was made pursuant to Congress’s Article I, Section 8 powers, 
and (2) the expenditure violated some express constitutional provision 
restricting those powers.52  Justice Harlan warned in dissent that these 
limitations were untenable, and that the Flast holding ultimately would 
erode to the point where the federal anti–taxpayer standing principles were 
eviscerated.53  A concurring Justice Douglas agreed but welcomed the 
outcome.54 
Both were wrong.  The ensuing decades saw a hasty retreat from Flast by 
the Court.55  Two prominent 1974 decisions rejected taxpayer lawsuits 
based on the Accounts and Compatibility Clauses of the U.S. 
Constitution.56  In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for 
Separation of Church & State, Inc.,57 the Court further limited the Flast 
exception by rejecting a challenge to the transfer of a government hospital 
 
 48. See, e.g., Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (rejecting a taxpayer challenge to the 
nomination of Hugo Black to the Supreme Court); see also John DiManno, Note, Beyond 
Taxpayers’ Suits:  Public Interest Standing in the States, 41 CONN. L. REV. 639, 646 (2008) 
(summarizing post-Frothingham cases). 
 49. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
 50. Id. at 85–88. 
 51. Id. at 104–06. 
 52. Id. at 102–03; see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 71–72 
(7th ed. 2011). 
 53. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 131 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (calling Frothingham limits 
“untenable”). 
 54. Id. at 107 (Douglas, J., concurring) (predicting the ultimate “demise of 
[Frothingham]”). 
 55. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 609–10 (2007); 
see also DiManno, supra note 48, at 649.  Commentators frequently refer to Flast as “limited 
to its facts” or some similar formulation.  Indeed, a Westlaw law review database search for 
[Flast /20 limit! w/20 facts] conducted on February 22, 2012, generated 37 results, the 
majority of which contained some version of this description. 
 56. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 209 (1974) 
(rejecting the Compatibility Clause); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974) 
(rejecting the Accounts Clause). 
 57. 454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
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to a religious organization because it did not implicate Congress’s taxing 
and spending powers.58 
Most commentators view Valley Forge as effectively cementing Flast’s 
status as a one-off exception to the general federal anti–taxpayer standing 
principles.59  The Court confirmed this interpretation in recent years.  In 
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,60 it was presented with a 
challenge to an Executive Branch program intended to encourage faith-
based organizations to compete for federal grants.61  The plaintiff attacked 
the program on Establishment Clause grounds, asserting that his taxpayer 
status gave him standing.62  Justice Alito, writing for the majority, 
disagreed.63  He noted that the program was funded through general 
executive appropriations and not a specific Article I, Section 8 
appropriation.64  Justice Alito thus opined that “this case falls outside ‘the 
narrow exception’ that Flast ‘created to the general rule against taxpayer 
standing established in Frothingham.’”65  He endorsed the prevailing view 
that “in the four decades since its creation, the Flast exception has largely 
been confined to its facts.”66 
B.  State Taxpayers in Federal Court 
The question of whether the taxpayer standing limitations in federal court 
applied to plaintiffs challenging state (and not federal) expenditures was left 
open for decades.67  Much of this uncertainty traces back to Frothingham 
itself, which noted that “[t]he interest of a taxpayer of a municipality in the 
 
 58. Id. at 479.  The Court noted that the transfer in Valley Forge was undertaken via the 
Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.  This distinction 
results in the absurd situation whereby a plaintiff would have standing to challenge an 
appropriation of funds to a religious institution for the purpose of purchasing land, but he or 
she would not have standing to challenge the transfer of the land itself. See, e.g., Valley 
Forge, 454 U.S. at 511–12 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the incoherence). 
 59. See, e.g., John J. Egan, III, Note, Analyzing Taxpayer Standing in Terms of General 
Standing Principles:  The Road Not Taken, 63 B.U. L. REV. 717, 717 (1983) (characterizing 
Flast as “virtually overruled”); Eric B. Schnurer, Note, “More Than an Intuition, Less Than 
a Theory”:  Toward a Coherent Doctrine of Standing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 564, 566 (1986) 
(“[Flast] is today essentially a dead letter.”). 
 60. 551 U.S. 587 (2007). 
 61. Id. at 594. 
 62. Id. at 596. 
 63. Id. at 597. 
 64. Id. at 605. 
 65. Id. at 608 (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618 (1988)). 
 66. Id. at 609.  This was not enough for Justice Scalia.  He opened his concurrence by 
calling the distinctions between Flast and the subsequent taxpayer standing cases “utterly 
meaningless.” Id. at 618 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Scalia further opined that the Court should 
either overrule Flast or grant standing to all taxpayers asserting a constitutional spending 
violation. Id. at 633. 
 67. See Staudt, supra note 39, at 815–18 (concluding that as of 2003, “the full Court, 
notwithstanding numerous opportunities, has failed to impose explicit limitations that mirror 
the Flast doctrine for state taxpayers”); Richard M. Elias, Note, Confusion in the Realm of 
Taxpayer Standing:  The State of State Taxpayer Standing in the Eighth Circuit, 66 MO. L. 
REV. 413, 413–25 (2001) (noting the same as of 2001). 
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application of its moneys is direct and immediate and the remedy by 
injunction to prevent their misuse is not inappropriate.  It is upheld by a 
large number of state cases and is the rule of this Court.”68 
Federal courts have long interpreted this observation to grant standing to 
taxpayers challenging county or municipal expenditures.69  Indeed, the 
proposition that federal anti–taxpayer standing principles do not apply to 
local taxpayers is now uncontroversial.70  That may seem odd at first blush.  
There generally are orders of magnitude fewer taxpayers at the local level, 
but on the other hand, a typical taxpayer pays far more to the federal 
government and could be affected to a greater degree by an unlawful 
expenditure of those tax dollars.71  And in any event, the idea that a federal 
taxpayer who contributed (say) 0.000001 percent of a challenged 
expenditure has not suffered a sufficiently particularized injury to convey 
standing, whereas a local taxpayer who contributed 0.001 percent of one 
has, makes little sense.  Regardless, it is the law.72 
But local taxpayers are not state taxpayers, and for many decades, the 
Supreme Court was silent as to whether the latter group would have 
standing to challenge purportedly unlawful state expenditures.73  Prior to 
2006, the Court addressed state taxpayer standing on only one occasion, and 
even then it did not resolve the question.74  Any confusion was dispelled in 
 
 68. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923). 
 69. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 349 (2006); Staudt, supra 
note 39, at 825–26 (discussing local taxpayer lawsuits); Kyle B. Gee, Note and Comment, 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno—Denying State Taxpayers Standing in Federal Court:  Are 
Municipal Taxpayers Next?, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 1241, 1251 (2007) (same); see also David 
Spencer, Note, What’s the Harm?  Nontaxpayer Standing To Challenge Religious Symbols, 
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1071, 1072 n.2 (2011).  Some question whether the rationale for 
local taxpayer standing still holds in light of the Court’s recent anti–taxpayer standing 
decisions. See, e.g., Smith v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 641 F.3d 197, 221–22 
(6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring) (arguing that the local taxpayer standing rule is no 
longer defensible). 
 70. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 349 (citing without challenging 
Frothingham’s local taxpayer exception). 
 71. See Staudt, supra note 39, at 841 n.328 (generally comparing federal and local tax 
burdens).  Professor Staudt also observes that many municipalities are actually bigger than 
some small states, with correspondingly larger budgets. See id. at 841 & n.328. 
 72. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 613 (1989) (reaffirming Frothingham’s 
acceptance of municipal taxpayer suits).  One explanation for this aspect of taxpayer 
standing jurisprudence is that municipal taxpayers are more akin to a corporation’s 
shareholders, and not citizens of a particular nation or state. Id. (hinting at a corporation-
based explanation); Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487 (same). 
 73. See, e.g., Gee, supra note 69, at 1251–52 (discussing the Court’s pre-
DaimlerChrysler state taxpayer standing jurisprudence); Staudt, supra note 39, at 815–18 
(same). 
 74. See Doremus v. Bd. of Educ. of Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429 (1952).  In Doremus, New 
Jersey taxpayer-citizens challenged a state law providing for the reading of biblical verses at 
the beginning of each school day.  See id. at 430.  The plaintiffs claimed standing as state 
taxpayers. See id. at 431.  The Court rejected the argument, essentially viewing the case as a 
religious dispute and not an attempt to vindicate any legitimate taxpayer interest. See id. at 
434–35.  It left open the possibility that other state taxpayers might have standing, however, 
observing that “[t]he taxpayer’s action can meet [the federal standing] test, but only when it 
is a good-faith pocketbook action.  It is apparent that the grievance which it is sought to 
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DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno.75  The plaintiffs in the case consisted of 
Ohio taxpayers.76  They challenged a state franchise tax credit intended to 
encourage businesses to purchase new manufacturing equipment on the 
theory that it violated the “dormant” or “negative” Commerce Clause.77  
The plaintiffs claimed they had taxpayer standing because the credit 
depleted the state taxpayer funds to which they had contributed.78  The 
Court rejected the argument.  It restated the basis for the anti–taxpayer 
standing rule first announced in Frothingham and held:  “The foregoing 
rationale for rejecting federal taxpayer standing applies with undiminished 
force to state taxpayers.”79  The Court recently reaffirmed this result in 
Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn.80 
II.  STATE TAXPAYER STANDING IN STATE COURT 
Part II discusses state taxpayer standing rules as applied in state courts.  
It focuses on both the state-by-state breakdown of which jurisdictions 
permit taxpayer lawsuits, and then discusses the general variations in those 
rules. 
A.  State Taxpayer Standing Rules Generally 
It may be a tautology to say that state courts are not federal courts, but 
this does not make the observation any less true.  The substantially 
dissimilar state taxpayer standing rules employed by the two types of 
tribunals are an excellent real-world demonstration of this axiom.  The 
Supreme Court frequently has observed that state courts are not bound by 
any standing and justiciability limitations arising from Article III of the 
U.S. Constitution.81  This includes the general federal refusal to adjudicate 
federal and state taxpayer lawsuits.82  State courts therefore are free to hear 
 
litigate here is not a direct dollars-and-cents injury but is a religious difference.” Id. at 434; 
see also Staudt, supra note 39, at 803–04 (summarizing Doremus’s holding). 
 75. 547 U.S. 332 (2006). 
 76. See id. at 338–39. 
 77. See Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 386 F.3d 738, 742–43 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(describing the Commerce Clause theory). 
 78. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 337–39.  Other plaintiffs claimed standing as local 
taxpayers, arguing that any depletion to the state funds would ultimately deprive their local 
government of state-provided moneys. Id. at 349–50.  The Court rejected that argument as 
merely “recasting” their state taxpayer challenge. Id. at 350. 
 79. Id. at 343–45. 
 80. See 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1444–45 (2011) (rejecting state taxpayer challenge to tuition tax 
credits). 
 81. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often 
that the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts . . . .”); see also Hershkoff, 
supra note 30, at 1836–37  (“State courts, however, are not bound by Article III, and judicial 
practice in some states differs—and differs radically—from the federal model.”). 
 82. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law:  A 
Critique of the Supreme Court’s Theory that Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1289, 1295–96 (2005) (“State judges are not bound by Article III and 
therefore can apply more lenient justiciability rules—for instance, by allowing taxpayer 
standing. . . .”); Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1836–37. 
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any and all lawsuits by taxpayers challenging a purportedly unlawful or 
illegal expenditure if they wish.  And they do.  Most states—though not all, 
as some suggest—allow state taxpayer actions, and they have for decades.83 
Permissive taxpayer standing regimes derive from different sources in 
different states.  They are court-created doctrines in most jurisdictions.84  In 
the remainder, a statute, civil procedure rule, or specific constitutional 
provision authorizes at least some degree of taxpayer or citizen lawsuit.85  
Whether a state’s taxpayer standing regime ultimately derives from the 
common law or traces back to a statute, civil procedure rule, or 
constitutional provision matters very little in practice, however.  The 
doctrines quickly take on a life of their own in either scenario, although a 
few states take express statutory limitations seriously,86 and there are a 
handful of procedural quirks that seem unlikely to have arisen 
 
 83. See, e.g., Jennifer Friesen, Recovering Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 
TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1301 (1985); Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1855; Varu Chilakamarri, 
Comment, Taxpayer Standing:  A Step Toward Animal-Centric Litigation, 10 ANIMAL L. 
251, 254–55 (2004); DiManno, supra note 48, at 656–57; Parsons, supra note 39, at 962–64; 
Michael J. Zidonik, Suzanne Reynolds, & Evelyn J. Lambeth, Comment, Taxpayers’ 
Actions:  Public Invocation of the Judiciary, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 402–03 (1977); 
see also James W. Doggett, Note, “Trickle Down” Constitutional Interpretation:  Should 
Federal Limits on Legislative Conferral of Standing Be Imported into State Constitutional 
Law?, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 840 n.8 (2008). 
 84. These tend to fall within three sometimes overlapping subcategories.  Some 
doctrines arise independently after a detailed analysis. See, e.g., Fergus v. Russel, 110 N.E. 
130, 135–36 (Ill. 1915); Borden v. La. State Bd. of Educ., 123 So. 655, 659 (La. 1929).  
Others borrow the well-established local taxpayer action tradition, often without detailed 
analysis. See, e.g., Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Ky. 1965); Herr v. Rudolf, 25 
N.W.2d 916, 919 (N.D. 1947).  In a final group of state decisions, mostly dating to the early 
1970s, courts rely on the seemingly apparent liberalization trend in Flast as the basis for 
their own state rules. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 559 P.2d 630, 634–35 n.9 (Alaska 1977); 
Dodge v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 600 P.2d 70, 72 (Colo. 1979). 
 85. There are not always clean divisions between these groups.  In some states, for 
example, a specific textual provision has been interpreted to authorize state taxpayer or 
citizen lawsuits, but the actual language in question does not necessarily compel that result. 
See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 16, § 13 (“Any citizen of any county, city or town may institute 
suit, in behalf of himself and all others interested, to protect the inhabitants thereof against 
the enforcement of any illegal exactions whatever.”); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526a (West 
2011) (authorizing citizen-taxpayer lawsuits against “any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or 
injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a county, town, city or city and county”); 
Farrell v. Oliver, 226 S.W. 529, 529–30 (Ark. 1921) (holding that the Arkansas 
constitutional provision permits state taxpayer lawsuits); Los Altos Prop. Owners Ass’n v. 
Hutcheon, 137 Cal. Rptr. 775 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (noting that section 526a has been 
“judicially extended” to apply to state expenditures).  In others, a permissive common law 
taxpayer standing regime has evolved in some jurisdictions in parallel with an express 
statutory provision. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-212 to -213 (2011) (statutorily 
establishing the procedure for taxpayer lawsuits); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 123-b (McKinney 
2002) (same); see also Wein v. Comptroller, 386 N.E.2d 242, 243–45 (N.Y. 1979). But see 
Ethington v. Wright, 189 P.2d 209, 212–13 (Ariz. 1948) (independently authorizing common 
law taxpayer actions); Boryszewski v. Brydges, 334 N.E.2d 579, 581 (N.Y. 1975) (same). 
 86. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 123-b(1) (authorizing taxpayer lawsuits, but 
excepting challenges to government-issued debt); Wein, 386 N.E.2d at 244–45 (holding that 
the statute prohibiting taxpayer challenges of state debt overrides the prior common law 
regime). 
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independently in the courts.87  But overall, state taxpayer standing rules 
look indistinguishable in their development and implementation no matter 
their legal origin. 
The general permissiveness of state taxpayer standing doctrines has been 
the subject of academic commentary since at least 1960.88  In that year, the 
Yale Law Journal published a student work entitled Taxpayers’ Suits:  A 
Survey and Summary, which surveyed the taxpayer standing rules in every 
state.89  It observed that thirty-four states allowed state taxpayer lawsuits, 
fourteen others were unclear, and only two states definitively prohibited 
them.90  Commentators generally view this as the first comprehensive 
examination of state taxpayer standing rules, and they have cited it 
extensively over the past fifty years.91 
Scholarly discussion of the phenomenon has continued ever since.  A 
1961 article by Professor Louis Jaffe in the Harvard Law Review echoed 
the observation that most states allowed state taxpayer lawsuits.92  A 
student comment in the Wake Forest Law Review noted in 1977 that one of 
the two states (New York) identified by the Yale Law Journal survey as 
disallowing state taxpayer actions had reversed course, and by then only 
New Mexico prohibited taxpayer actions.93  Similar articles popped up 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s.94  Professor Hershkoff even observed that 
permissive state court taxpayer standing rules had become so widely 
acknowledged by 2001 that they were “for the most part uncontroversial.”95 
 
 87. In Massachusetts, for example, a taxpayer action will only be permitted if brought by 
no fewer than twenty-four taxpayers, no more than six of whom may be from the same 
county. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 29, § 63 (LexisNexis 2007); see also Richards v. 
Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 67 N.E.2d 583 (Mass. 1946) (applying taxpayer standing 
statute). 
 88. A 1937 student note in the Harvard Law Review touched—but did not focus—on 
state taxpayer standing rules. See Note, Taxpayers’ Suits as a Means of Controlling the 
Expenditure of Public Funds, 50 HARV. L. REV. 1275 (1937) [hereinafter Note, Controlling 
the Expenditure]. 
 89. See generally Comment, Taxpayers’ Suits, supra note 23. 
 90. Id. at 900–02. 
 91. See, e.g., Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 794, (9th Cir. 1999); 
Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New Approach to 
Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633, 664 (2011); Chilakamarri, supra note 
83, at 259–62; Gee, supra note 69, at 1265 n.184; Louis L. Jaffe, Standing To Secure 
Judicial Review:  Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1266 n.2 (1961).  According to 
West’s KeyCite service, as of November 16, 2012, the survey has been cited by thirty-nine 
judicial decisions and thirty-five legal journals or secondary sources. 
 92. See Jaffe, supra note 91, at 1280–81 (observing that twenty-seven states expressly 
permit state taxpayer lawsuits, and nine more might permit them). 
 93. See Zidonik et al., supra note 83, at 402–03. 
 94. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves:  Commerce Clause 
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 414–16 (1996); 
Friesen, supra note 83, at 1301–03; Robert M. Myers, Standing in Public Interest Litigation:  
Removing the Procedural Barriers, 15 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 3 (1981); Parsons, supra note 
39, at 967–68; Michael Weiss, Comment, The Texas Tax Relief Act After Twelve Years:  
Adoption, Implementation & Enforcement, 23 ST. MARY’S L.J. 491, 503–06 (1991). 
 95. See Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1854–55. 
 2012] DISFAVORED CONSTITUTION, PASSIVE VIRTUES? 1277 
Some commentators suggest that this disparity between federal and state 
taxpayer standing doctrines is not particularly meaningful in practice.  This 
assertion dates back to at least 1969, when Professor Kenneth Davis argued 
that the then-existing permissive state taxpayer standing rules had not 
resulted in a flood of unmeritorious taxpayer lawsuits.96  Renowned state 
constitutional scholar (and former Oregon Supreme Court Justice) Hans 
Linde echoed the view in 2005, observing that during his tenure the Oregon 
high court often was willing to reject cases on justiciability grounds, despite 
the fact that Oregon courts permit taxpayer actions.97  This proposition is an 
interesting one, though more rigorous empirical work suggests that the 
question is more complicated than Professors Davis and Linde 
envisioned.98 
B.  The Surprising Nonuniversality of State Taxpayer Standing Rules 
And yet the notion that virtually every jurisdiction permits state taxpayer 
lawsuits is largely overstated.  Commentators have long characterized state 
taxpayer standing rules as permissive “in nearly every state,”99 but that is 
not entirely accurate.  This Article’s survey of state taxpayer standing 
doctrines observed that “only” thirty-six states—the majority to be sure, but 
far from all—clearly permit state taxpayer lawsuits.100  In contrast, eight 
states now prohibit state taxpayer actions, and it is unclear in six additional 
states whether taxpayers can challenge purportedly unlawful state 
government expenditures.101 
The eight states that depart from the majority rule fall into two 
categories.  Three—Kansas, New Hampshire, and Virginia—simply reject 
such lawsuits outright.102  One should not be too critical of their omission 
from the academic state taxpayer standing commentary.  The rejection of 
permissive state taxpayer standing regimes is a recent phenomenon in 
 
 96. See Kenneth C. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 
470–71 (1970). 
 97. See Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal Courts in Governance:  Vive la 
Différence!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273, 1282–83 (2005). 
 98. See, e.g., Staudt, supra note 39, at 779–82.  Professor Staudt suggests that taxpayer 
lawsuits are far more commonly allowed in federal court than academic commentators 
believe.  Her Taxpayers in Court article documents a study finding dozens of Supreme Court 
and hundreds of lower federal court cases involving taxpayer actions over the past several 
decades. Id. at 800–04.  This also could be occurring at the state level. 
 99. DiManno, supra note 48, at 656.  For example, in 1985, Professor Jennifer Friesen 
characterized state taxpayer standing rules as follows:  “Every state now permits taxpayer 
actions against municipalities, and all but New Mexico permit them for state taxpayers as 
well.” Friesen, supra note 83, at 1301 n.165. 
 100. See infra Appendix. 
 101. See infra Appendix. 
 102. Kansas and New Hampshire disallow both state and local taxpayer actions, whereas 
Virginia permits the latter. See, e.g., Theisman v. City of Overland Park, 253 P.3d 798, 2011 
WL 2637452, at *8 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that Kansas courts do not permit taxpayer 
actions); Baer v. N.H. Dep’t. of Educ., 8 A.3d 48, 51–52 (N.H. 2010) (rejecting state 
taxpayer standing and overruling prior decisions to the contrary); Goldman v. Landsidle, 552 
S.E.2d 67, 72 (Va. 2001) (expressly adopting the federal prohibition of taxpayer standing). 
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Virginia (2001) and New Hampshire (2010), and state taxpayer standing 
commentators have long been unclear with respect to Kansas.103 
The remaining five definitive anti–taxpayer standing states—Indiana, 
New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, and Wyoming—present a different story.  
These states permit “public importance” or “public interest” lawsuits, 
effectively in lieu of traditional taxpayer actions.104  Under the public 
importance standing doctrine, undifferentiated citizens or residents of a 
state will be permitted to bring a lawsuit challenging government conduct, 
but only in cases involving a matter of “great” or “substantial” public 
importance.105 
It is tempting to characterize public importance lawsuits as the equivalent 
of pure citizen actions and, thus, a broader form of taxpayer actions.106  
This Article rejects that view.  Both taxpayer and public importance 
lawsuits involve non-Hohfeldian litigants, yet there are substantial 
distinctions between the doctrines, and the universes of plaintiffs do not 
overlap completely.  Taxpayer lawsuits generally require that the plaintiff 
has paid taxes,107 and the plaintiff normally must be challenging some 
 
 103. See Comment, Taxpayers’ Suits, supra note 23, at 901 n.33 (classifying Kansas 
taxpayer standing law as unclear).  The 1986 Temple comment by Susan Parsons cites a 
Kansas civil procedure rule as authorizing taxpayer actions, but upon closer inspection, this 
provision narrowly authorizes only challenges to unauthorized contracts. Compare KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 60-907 (1963), with Parsons, supra note 39, at 974 & n.176. 
 104. See State ex rel. Cittadine v. Ind. Dep’t of Transp., 790 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ind. 2003) 
(describing Indiana public standing doctrine); State ex rel. Coll v. Johnson, 990 P.2d 1277, 
1284 (N.M. 1999) (allowing citizen lawsuits involving “clear threats to the essential nature 
of state government guaranteed to New Mexico citizens under their Constitution”); State ex 
rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1082 (Ohio 1999) 
(authorizing citizen lawsuits “when the issues sought to be litigated are of great importance 
and interest to the public”); Burns v. Sundlun, 617 A.2d 114, 116 (R.I. 1992) (“On rare 
occasions this court has overlooked the standing requirement to determine the merits of a 
case of substantial public interest.”); Jolley v. State Loan & Inv. Bd., 38 P.3d 1073, 1077 
(Wyo. 2002) (“We have recognized a more expansive or relaxed definition of standing when 
a matter of great public interest or importance is at stake.”).  The standing rules in Ohio and 
Rhode Island are more complicated than the foregoing generalization.  Ohio permits state 
taxpayer lawsuits for a plaintiff contesting an expenditure from a special fund. See State ex 
rel. Masterson v. Ohio State Racing Comm’n, 123 N.E.2d 1, 2–3 (Ohio 1954).  Rhode Island 
allows taxpayers to sue if they have suffered a particularized injury not shared by other 
similarly-situated taxpayers. See Ianero v. Town of Johnston, 477 A.2d 619, 621 (R.I. 1984).  
For the purposes of this Article, these states seem sufficiently restrictive to be classified as 
prohibiting such actions. 
 105. See, e.g., DiManno, supra note 48, at 665–77 (discussing public importance or 
public interest doctrine).  A handful of additional states allow both taxpayer and public 
importance lawsuits. Id. at 677.  Alaska is particularly difficult because it sometimes merges 
the two doctrines, and it is hard to determine whether it permits taxpayer or public interest 
lawsuits, or some hybrid of the two. See, e.g., Trs. for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324 (Alaska 
1987) (discussing Alaska’s taxpayer-citizen standing doctrine).  This Article errs on the side 
of caution and characterizes it as a permissive taxpayer standing jurisdiction. 
 106. See, e.g., 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 24, § 3531.10.1, at 37 
(“[T]axpayer standing often has been asserted as an alternative to a more general theory of 
citizen standing.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2001) (holding that taxpayer-
plaintiff must be a taxpayer); Citizens Council Against Crime v. Bjork, 529 P.2d 1072, 1074 
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government action that theoretically affects his or her tax burden.108  But 
standing normally will exist if those criteria are met.  Public importance 
lawsuits, on the other hand, can be brought to challenge virtually any 
government action, but only in extraordinary circumstances involving a 
substantial public interest, as determined by the court overseeing the 
lawsuit.109  Therefore, while some taxpayer lawsuits likely would be 
permitted in public importance states (and vice versa), many would not, and 
many public importance lawsuits are not taxpayer actions under any 
reasonable definition of the term.  It thus seems inappropriate to call these 
states permissive taxpayer standing jurisdictions. 
There are also six states in which it is at least somewhat unclear whether 
state taxpayer lawsuits would be permitted.  Three of the six—Idaho, 
Hawaii, and Vermont—permit local taxpayer lawsuits.110  The state 
decisions establishing this permissive taxpayer standing rule are broad 
enough on their face that state taxpayer actions likely would be permitted, 
but there were no published or reported decisions involving such lawsuits.  
Nevada lacks any taxpayer standing jurisprudence (state or local), so one 
cannot tell whether the state would permit state taxpayer actions.  The 
Michigan Supreme Court announced in 2001 that it generally would 
prohibit taxpayer lawsuits under the theory that Michigan standing law is 
equivalent to its federal counterpart,111 yet it reversed that holding nine 
years later.112  Michigan ultimately is likely to permit state taxpayer 
lawsuits, but this reversal was recent enough that no subsequent decisions 
delineate the state’s taxpayer standing rules.  Finally, the state taxpayer 
standing cases in South Carolina are substantially contradictory, and the 
status of the law is unclear.113 
 
(Wash. 1975) (“[P]etitioner . . . . alleges that its members are taxpayers, but they are not 
parties to this action. We cannot treat it as a taxpayer suit.”); 74 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 39, 
§ 7. 
 108. For example, many states require that the taxpayer must be challenging an 
expenditure made from a fund into which he or she actually paid. See infra note 119 (listing 
cases from Arkansas, Iowa, Maine, and Minnesota requiring that the challenged expenditure 
must be from a fund into which the taxpayer-plaintiff has paid or will pay). But see infra 
note 122 (noting that Colorado, West Virginia, and perhaps Washington may permit state 
taxpayer actions challenging nonfiscal government conduct). 
 109. See, e.g., DiManno, supra note 48, at 665–77 (discussing public importance standing 
requirements); Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1857–58 (same). 
 110. See, e.g., Akau v. Olohana Corp., 652 P.2d 1130, 1133–34 (Haw. 1982); Ameritel 
Inns, Inc. v. Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 119 P.3d 624, 627–28 (Idaho 2005); Cent. Vt. 
Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Town of Springfield, 379 A.2d 677, 679 (Vt. 1977).  With respect to 
Vermont, one state supreme court decision references a prior case in which state taxpayers 
were permitted to challenge unlawful expenditures, but the cited decision does not directly 
address the issue of taxpayer standing. See Brigham v. State, 889 A.2d 715, 719 (Vt. 2005). 
 111. See, e.g., Lee v. Macomb Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 629 N.W.2d 900, 907–08 (Mich. 
2001). 
 112. See Lansing Schs. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 699 
(Mich. 2010). 
 113. Compare ATC S., Inc. v. Charleston Cnty., 669 S.E.2d 337, 340–41 (S.C. 2008) 
(“The injury to ATC, however, as a taxpayer is common to all property owners in Charleston 
County.  This feature of commonality defeats the constitutional requirement of a concrete 
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So what should be made of the fact that the permissiveness of state court 
standing rules is not quite as universal as commentators suggest?  First, as 
indicated by the recent New Hampshire and Virginia decisions restricting 
state taxpayer standing rules and even the since-reversed similar trend in 
Michigan, the same narrowing of taxpayer standing principles at the federal 
level seems to be trickling down to at least a handful of states.114  This 
should not be surprising given the influence of federal justiciability law on 
state courts.115 
Second, the characterization of state taxpayer standing regimes as 
uniformly permissive invokes an understandable, but unfortunate, tendency 
among academics to view certain areas of state law as relatively 
homogenous on a state-to-state basis, and then compare this single generic 
“state” law with its federal counterpart.116  This may help to highlight a 
noteworthy contrast between federal and the mainstream or majority state 
law on a particular issue, but it does so at a substantial cost.  The 
overgeneralization can portray states as more homogenous than they really 
are.  That, in turn, minimizes differences between states that could be just as 
worthy of analysis as the federal-state contrast that the commentators were 
trying to address in the first place.117  For example, the mainstream view 
 
and particularized injury.”), with Sloan v. Dep’t of Transp., 666 S.E.2d 236, 241 (S.C. 2008) 
(“Nonetheless, ‘[a] taxpayer’s standing to challenge unauthorized or illegal governmental 
acts has been repeatedly recognized in South Carolina.’” (citing Sloan v. Sch. Dist. of 
Greenville Cnty., 537 S.E.2d 299 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000))).  The state also permits citizen 
lawsuits invoking an important public interest. See Sloan v. Sanford, 593 S.E.2d 470, 472 
(S.C. 2004). 
 114. See Gee, supra note 69, at 1273–76 (“Taxpayer standing has paralleled standing 
doctrine in general, which, since the founding era, has become increasingly more 
preclusive.”); Staudt, supra note 39, at 773 (“[T]he undisputed view among legal scholars 
and commentators is that taxpayers, for a brief period in history, did have standing to bring 
lawsuits in federal court but judges for the most part have denied taxpayers the opportunity 
to be heard in court.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Schnurer, supra note 59, at 566 (noting 
the same). 
 115. See Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and Constitutional Socio-
Economic Rights:  Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 923, 969–70 
(2011); see also City of Greenwood Vill. v. Petitioners for the Proposed City of Centennial, 
3 P.3d 427, 436 n.7 (Colo. 2000) (“[S]imilar considerations underlie both Colorado and 
federal standing law, and we frequently consult federal cases for persuasive authority.”); 
Dover Historical Soc’y v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 838 A.2d 1103, 1111 (Del. 
2003) (“This Court has recognized that the Lujan requirements for establishing standing 
under Article III to bring an action in federal court are generally the same as the standards 
for determining standing to bring a case or controversy within the courts of Delaware.”); 
ACLU of N.M. v. Albuquerque, 188 P.3d 1222, 1227 (N.M. 2008) (“New Mexico’s standing 
jurisprudence indicates that our state courts have long been guided by the traditional federal 
standing analysis.”). 
 116. See, e.g., David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 708 
(2005) (“To the extent that state courts consult the academic literature, they are likely to find 
either that their own state constitutions are not discussed at all, or that their constitutional 
law is fungible with that of other states . . . .”). 
 117. What these differences might mean is a different story altogether.  For example, the 
early “New Judicial Federalism” proponents argued that state constitutions reflect the 
specific character and values of their respective states; critics of this movement generally 
scoff at that, arguing that the view is divorced from any historical reality. See, e.g., James A. 
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that state taxpayer standing rules are uniformly permissive easily could 
obscure the recent microtrend in a handful of states to eliminate or narrow 
these doctrines.  This is a development that deserves comment, yet the 
mainstream view that sees state taxpayer standing doctrines as uniformly 
permissive precludes that discussion. 
C.  The Contours of State Taxpayer Standing Rules 
The specific contours of the various state taxpayer standing doctrines can 
reflect fundamental attributes that are responsible for the creation and 
purpose of permissive taxpayer standing regimes in the first place, and as 
such, a brief discussion is warranted.118  Perhaps the most frequent state 
taxpayer standing requirement is that there must be a nexus between the 
plaintiff’s taxes and the government conduct being challenged.  In other 
words, a taxpayer can only challenge government conduct that has the 
potential to affect his or her tax burden, even if only in a minute way.  This 
often means that a state expenditure involving a specific fund can only be 
challenged by taxpayers who have paid into that fund.119  Some states 
further limit taxpayer standing to actions challenging allegedly improper 
government expenditures, and not revenue collection measures.120  Others 
distinguish between illegal expenditures (which can be challenged) and 
improvident ones (which cannot).121  All of that said, a handful of states 
allow taxpayers to challenge virtually any government conduct, regardless 
of how it affects state taxpayer dollars.122  Taxpayer actions in these 
 
Gardner, Southern Character, Confederate Nationalism, and the Interpretation of State 
Constitutions:  A Case Study in Constitutional Argument, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1219, 1221 
(1998). 
 118. That said, previous commentators have compiled an exhaustive list of the various 
state taxpayer standing requirements, and it is unnecessary to do so here. See, e.g., 
Chilakamarri, supra note 83, app. A at 271. 
 119. See, e.g., McGhee v. Ark. State Bd. of Collection Agencies, 243 S.W.3d 278, 283 
(Ark. 2006) (holding that a taxpayer must have contributed to the challenged expenditure); 
Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 698 N.W.2d 858, 871 (Iowa 2005) (a taxpayer must show an effect 
on a fund to which he or she has paid or will pay); Collins v. State, 750 A.2d 1257, 1260–61 
(Me. 2000) (same); see also Conant v. Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, L.L.P., 603 N.W.2d 
143, 147 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that taxpayers lacked standing to challenge legal 
fees because the fees would not necessarily be deposited in a fund into which they had or 
would pay). 
 120. See, e.g., Citizens for Rule of Law v. Senate Comm. on Rules & Admin., 770 
N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); Manzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d 656, 659–61 (Mo. 
2011) (holding that tax credits are not expenditures); see also Munger v. State, 689 S.E.2d 
230, 239–40 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (declining to extend state taxpayer standing rules to 
situations not involving unlawful expenditures); Fent v. Contingency Review Bd., 163 P.3d 
512, 520 (Okla. 2007) (emphasizing that a taxpayer can challenge an unlawful expenditure). 
 121. See, e.g., Soukup v. Sell, 104 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tenn. 1937). 
 122. See, e.g., Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238, 246–47 (Colo. 2008) (suggesting that 
taxpayers will have standing to challenge any constitutional violation); Smith v. W. Va. State 
Bd. of Educ., 295 S.E.2d 680, 683 (W. Va. 1982) (“Moreover, where the right sought to be 
enforced is a public one in the sense that it is based upon a general statute or affects the 
public at large the mandamus proceeding can be brought by any citizen, taxpayer, or 
voter.”); see also Greater Harbor 2000 v. City of Seattle, 937 P.2d 1082, 1090–91 (Wash. 
1997) (noting the same with respect to a local taxpayer action and implying that the principle 
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jurisdictions are little more than citizen lawsuits with the extra requirement 
that the plaintiff has paid taxes. 
Another typical standing limitation is that taxpayers can only seek to 
enjoin prospective spending.  Courts in these states do not permit taxpayer 
actions attempting to recoup prior unlawful expenditures on behalf of the 
government.123  Taxpayers in other jurisdictions cannot sue to compel a 
government official to undertake an affirmative action—they can only 
block an improper expenditure.124  A few states impose the requirement that 
a taxpayer-plaintiff must show an actual impact on his or her taxes.125  It is 
not enough to allege that public funds are being improperly spent; the 
taxpayer must aver facts sufficient to show that the illicit spending actually 
results in higher taxes.  States vary as to how specific that showing must 
be.126 
One not-uncommon requirement is that the taxpayer-plaintiff must alert 
the relevant government unit to the improper conduct before initiating the 
lawsuit, and he or she can only proceed with the case if the government 
refuses to take corrective action.127  The failure to provide this notification 
 
would hold at the state level); Parsons, supra note 39, at 971–73 & nn.147–57 (discussing 
the trend in some states to allow taxpayer challenges to nonfiscal conduct). 
 123. See, e.g., Beckerle v. Moore 909 So.2d 185, 187–88 (Ala. 2005); Dewhurst v. 
Hendee, 253 S.W.3d 320, 331–32 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008). 
 124. See, e.g., Reeder v. Wagner, No. 435, 2008 (Del. June 2, 2009), available at 
http://courts.delaware.gov/OPINIONS/download.ASPx?ID=122440; Mouton v. Dep’t of 
Wildlife & Fisheries, 657 So. 2d 622, 626–28 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
 125. See, e.g., Seymour v. Region One Bd. of Educ., 874 A.2d 742, 749 (Conn. 2005) 
(“‘It is not enough for the plaintiff to show that her tax dollars have contributed to the 
challenged project . . . .  [T]he plaintiff must prove that the project has directly or indirectly 
increased her taxes . . . .’” (citing Seymour v. Region One Bd. of Educ., 803 A.2d 318 
(Conn. 2002))); Kerpelman v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 276 A.2d 56, 60–61 (Md. 1971) (same); 
Demartino v. Marion County, 184 P.3d 1176, 1179–80 (Or. Ct. App. 2008) (same); see also 
Berent v. City of Iowa City, 738 N.W.2d 193, 202–03 (Iowa 2007) (holding that when a 
taxpayer pays into the fund from which an illegal expenditure is made, an actual impact on 
taxes is presumed). 
 126. For example, in Connecticut’s restrictive taxpayer standing regime, a suggested 
inference that an illegal expenditure necessarily will increase the plaintiff’s taxes will not be 
enough to convey standing. See, e.g., Conn. Post LP v. State Traffic Comm’n, No. 
X01CV990160337S, 2000 WL 33983848, at *5–6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2000).  Iowa 
courts, in contrast, sometimes permit such inferences. See Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 698 
N.W.2d 858, 865 (Iowa 2005). 
 127. See, e.g., Parsons v. S.D. Lottery Comm’n, 504 N.W.2d 593, 596 (S.D. 1993) (“[I]n 
taxpayer actions, the plaintiffs are required to ask the state attorney general to bring an action 
on behalf of the public or show why such request would be futile.”); Saucier v. Emp’t Sec. 
Dep’t of the State of Wash., 954 P.2d 285, 287–88 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that in 
taxpayer actions, plaintiffs must first request action by the attorney general, and can only 
bring suit upon denial of this request); Jenner v. Wissore, 517 N.E.2d 1220, 1227–28 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1988) (same); see also Marjorie A. Shields, Application of Municipal Taxpayer 
Standing Doctrine, 51 A.L.R.6TH 333 (2010); Necessity and Sufficiency of Efforts To Induce 
Public Officers To Bring Suit as Condition of Taxpayer’s Right To Bring Suit, 124 A.L.R. 
585 (1940) (cataloguing authorities).  This requirement sometimes is statutory. See, e.g., 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-213 (2011) (permitting a lawsuit by an Arizona taxpayer only 
with sixty days notice to the attorney general). 
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is a bar to bringing a taxpayer lawsuit in some states,128 whereas others 
have carved out exceptions (e.g., notice is unnecessary if it would be 
pointless).129 
A few jurisdictions also permit taxpayer actions only for certain types of 
claims, usually limited to those invoking an important public policy 
interest.  Alaskan taxpayers, for instance, can only challenge “substantial” 
government expenditures.130  Taxpayers in Florida and perhaps Arizona 
will only have standing to challenge an unconstitutional (and not “merely” 
unlawful) government action absent a special interest.131 
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, a few states limit taxpayer 
actions to only those lawsuits that would be unable to be brought outside of 
the taxpayer action context due to a lack of traditional standing.132  Courts 
in these jurisdictions recognize that some claims against the government do 
not lend themselves to the type of particularized injury normally required to 
convey standing.  Any nominally affected state taxpayer can challenge the 
allegedly improper government conduct, but only when no one else likely 
would have standing to do so.  This limitation is perhaps the most 
interesting one because it reflects one of the first—and still most 
convincing—rationales for allowing taxpayer lawsuits in the first place. 
III.  EXPLAINING THE FEDERAL-STATE DISPARITY 
This next part discusses different explanations for the disparity between 
federal and state taxpayer standing principles.  It first addresses traditional 
theories before moving onto a discussion of the contributions Professor 
Hershkoff has made to state constitutional discourse.  This part then 
discusses the dynamic between permissive taxpayer standing rules and the 
limitations on government discretion over fiscal matters resulting from state 
constitutional provisions. 
 
 128. See, e.g., Parsons, 504 N.W.2d at 596 (holding that the only exception to the 
attorney general notice requirement is when he or she is already a party). 
 129. See, e.g., Farris v. Munro, 662 P.2d 821, 823–24 (Wash. 1983) (noting an exception 
to the notice rule when requiring it would be useless). 
 130. See Hoblit v. Comm’r of Natural Res., 678 P.2d 1337, 1340–41 (Alaska 1984) (the 
magnitude of the challenged transaction will be an important factor in determining whether 
to permit the action to proceed). 
 131. See N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Fornes, 476 So .2d 154, 155–56 (Fla. 1985); Dep’t of 
Revenue v. Markham, 396 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 1981).  Arizona is more complicated.  State 
taxpayer actions are permitted both by statute and the common law in that jurisdiction.  See 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-213 (authorizing taxpayer lawsuits by statute under certain 
circumstances); Ethington v. Wright, 189 P.2d 209 (Ariz. 1948) (permitting taxpayer lawsuit 
under the common law).  Some authority from the state suggests that common law taxpayer 
standing actions will only be permitted to challenge unconstitutional (and not “merely” 
unlawful) expenditures. See Bennett v. Napolitano, 81 P.3d 311, 318 (Ariz. 2003). 
 132. See Transactive Corp. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 706 N.E.2d 1180, 1184 
(N.Y. 1998) (rejecting a common law taxpayer action because there was no indication that 
no other potential plaintiff would have standing); Consumer Party of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 
507 A.2d 323, 329 (Pa. 1986) (stating a five-part test governing taxpayer lawsuits, the first 
part of which is whether “the governmental action would otherwise go unchallenged”). 
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A.  Traditional Theories 
The last point segues nicely into a discussion of the theories offered to 
explain the general permissiveness of state taxpayer standing rules in state 
courts and the corresponding narrow federal regime.  The early commentary 
focused on three aspects of state taxpayer standing doctrines.  First, a 
smattering of articles from the 1960s through the 1980s speculated that 
permissive state taxpayer standing rules evolved so as to permit judicial 
challenges to broad swaths of governmental activity that otherwise would 
have been immune from lawsuit under a federal injury-in-fact 
requirement.133  This assertion has some empirical support, as evidenced by 
the state court decisions identifying the enforceability of constitutional 
and/or statutory provisions as a main impetus for their embrace of liberal 
taxpayer standing rules.134 
Yet despite this observable link between enforceability concerns and 
these doctrines, and although more than one commentator has called 
potential unenforceability the “fundamental reason” underlying permissive 
state taxpayer standing rules,135 the few early scholars to address the 
argument did not elaborate on it.  The failure to develop this idea is 
unfortunate.  As discussed extensively throughout this Article, the notion 
that state taxpayer standing doctrines evolved to give teeth to potentially 
unenforceable state constitutional provisions generally seems correct, at 
least in the very specific context of state constitutional fiscal limitations.136 
A second, earlier theory explaining liberal state taxpayer standing rules is 
somewhat more developed.  The first articles to approach the subject of 
state taxpayer standing in a more analytical fashion focused on the 
historical tradition permitting taxpayer lawsuits at the local level, arguing 
that this pedigree largely explains why most states allowed such actions by 
the early 1960s.137  They essentially contend that state courts oftentimes co-
 
 133. See, e.g., Comment, Taxpayers’ Suits, supra note 23, at 910–11; Parsons, supra note 
39, at 955. 
 134. See supra note 29 (citing authorities from Alabama, Florida, Maine, and New York); 
see also Faden v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 227 A.2d 619, 621–22 (Pa. 1967) (“[T]he fundamental 
reason for granting standing is simply that otherwise a large body of governmental activity 
would be unchallengeable in the courts.”). 
 135. See Parsons, supra note 39, at 952–55 (1986); see also Chilakamarri, supra note 83, 
at 254 (favorably quoting Parsons). 
 136. See infra Parts IV.B.2, V.A. 
 137. See, e.g., Note, Controlling the Expenditure, supra note 88, at 1277–78.  The 1960 
Yale Law Journal survey, Taxpayers’ Suits, also opened with a discussion of the American 
historical precedents involving local taxpayers, which dated back to the mid-nineteenth 
century. See Comment, Taxpayers’ Suits, supra note 23, at 896–99.  It acknowledged that 
this line of authorities primarily evolved through municipal taxpayer lawsuits, but argued 
that, at the end of the day, there was little to distinguish these cases from state taxpayer 
actions, and thus it was only natural that state courts would evolve to permit them. Id. at 
900–02.  Professor Jaffe expanded upon this approach in his 1961 article.  He closely 
examined the early development of public actions generally, and taxpayer lawsuits 
specifically, in English and American courts in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See 
Jaffe, supra note 91, at 1269–82.  Like the Yale survey, he noted that the development of 
state taxpayer standing doctrines occurred almost exclusively through local actions, implying 
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opt the well-established tradition of permitting municipal or county 
taxpayer lawsuits and expand that doctrine to encompass analogous state 
actions. 
The main problem with both explanations is that they only tell half the 
story.  With respect to the first argument, for example, it is certainly true—
and again, empirically observable in the case law—that concerns about the 
enforceability of a particular constitutional provision or statute outside of 
the taxpayer action context are a major impetus for the state taxpayer 
standing doctrines in place in some jurisdictions.138  But so what?  There 
are federal constitutional provisions that, if violated, would be unlikely to 
result in a particularized injury sufficient to convey Article III standing to 
challenge those violations.139  They have not inexorably led to permissive 
federal taxpayer standing rules.140  Indeed, the Supreme Court addressed 
this precise issue in United States v. Richardson,141 and it emphatically 
rejected the idea that the potential unenforceability of a constitutional 
provision (in that case, the Accounts Clause142) is an argument in favor of 
taxpayer standing—quite the opposite, the Court opined.143  The argument 
may be a coherent theory on its face to explain why states generally permit 
taxpayer lawsuits, but it is substantially undercut by the federal-state 
disparity in practice. 
A similar point holds with respect to the local taxpayer action analogy.  
No one disputes that there is a strong historical basis for allowing local 
taxpayer lawsuits at the state level, and some courts no doubt were 
influenced by those rules to adopt an identical doctrine for state 
taxpayers.144  But the same historical tradition is present at the federal level 
as well.  Federal courts have long permitted municipal or county taxpayer 
lawsuits; this practice was expressly preserved in Frothingham, and it 
remains good law today.145  As such, the second theory also fails to explain 
 
that this was the genesis of the then-current permissive state taxpayer standing rule. Id. at 
1281–82. 
 138. See supra notes 29, 134 and accompanying text. 
 139. The Establishment Clause is the most notable of these, but there are a handful of 
others.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (authorizing Congress “[t]o raise and support 
Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two 
Years”); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (prohibiting the alteration of Congressional 
compensation until after an intervening election of Representatives). 
 140. See supra Part I.A (discussing restrictive federal taxpayer standing rules). 
 141. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
 142. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 143. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179–80.  The Court observed:  “In a very real sense, the 
absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these claims gives support to the 
argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveillance of Congress, and ultimately 
to the political process.” Id. at 179. 
 144. See supra note 84 (discussing states that adopt local taxpayer standing rules at the 
state level). 
 145. See supra Part I.B (discussing the permissive municipal taxpayer standing rules in 
federal court).  Some commentators speculate that in light of the increasingly restrictive 
federal standing decisions, the Frothingham municipal taxpayer standing exception is 
ultimately endangered. See, e.g., Gee, supra note 69, at 1273–78. 
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why these analogous local taxpayer standing rules were so influential in 
state but not federal court. 
A third potential explanation for the permissive state taxpayer standing 
doctrines offered by earlier146 and sometimes even contemporary147 
scholars is a purely textual one.  This rationale—if true—actually could 
explain why these rules are different at the state and federal levels, and not 
just why state courts might generally grant broad state taxpayer standing.  
The theory points to the Article III case and controversy requirement and 
suggests that because state constitutions frequently do not contain this 
language, the difference between the forums can be attributed to that 
omission.148 
This argument, however, is ultimately unconvincing for two reasons.  
First, many of the jurisdictional clauses in state constitutions actually 
contain roughly equivalent language to the federal case and controversy 
requirement.149  Yet the vast majority of these states still allow taxpayer 
lawsuits.150  There is nothing inherent in the particular wording of state 
analogues to the federal case and controversy requirement that explains why 
the federal jurisdictional grant has been interpreted so restrictively. 
This textual theory also ignores the widespread influence of federal 
standing jurisprudence on state decisions in the field, even in the absence of 
any similar state constitutional provision.  Some state constitutions may 
lack a textual equivalent to the Article III jurisdictional grant, but this does 
not mean that federal principles play no part in the creation of state 
justiciability rules.  To the contrary, state courts borrow heavily from their 
federal counterparts—especially with respect to standing requirements—
when formulating these doctrines, even without any case and controversy 
 
 146. See, e.g., Friesen, supra note 83, at 1299–1300; James A. Gardner, The Failed 
Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 808–09 (1992) (attributing 
liberal state taxpayer standing rules to a lack of limiting constitutional language). 
 147. See, e.g., Joy Chia & Sarah A. Seo, Battle of the Branches:  The Separation of 
Powers Doctrine in State Education Funding Suits, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 125, 128 
(2007); Robert J. Klee, What’s Good for School Finance Should Be Good for Environmental 
Justice:  Addressing Disparate Environmental Impacts Using State Courts and 
Constitutions, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 135, 164–65 (2005); Linde, supra note 97, at 1275; 
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, Citizen Suits, and the Enforcement of Federal 
Environmental Law by Non–Article III Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003, 1006–07 & n.16 
(2001). 
 148. See, e.g., Klee, supra note 147, at 164–65 (“State courts are courts of general 
jurisdiction, governed by state constitutions that seldom have ‘case or controversy’ (or 
jurisdictional) requirements for standing as federal courts . . . .”); Elmendorf, supra note 147, 
at 1006 (“Most state courts are courts of general jurisdiction, unfettered by constitutional 
provisions analogous to Article III.”). 
 149. See Doggett, supra note 83, at 876–77 (discussing state equivalents to the Article III 
“case and controversy” requirement).  For example, the California Constitution grants 
California courts jurisdiction over “cause[s].” See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(a).  The 
constitutions of Alaska, Kansas, North Carolina, and Oregon all expressly grant their state 
courts jurisdiction over “cases.” See Doggett, supra note 83, at 876 n.236. 
 150. See supra Part II.B (observing that only eight states expressly disallow taxpayer 
lawsuits). 
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approximation.151  Why should taxpayer standing principles be immune 
from this influence? 
So all of these traditional explanations for the general permissiveness of 
state taxpayer standing rules are fundamentality unsatisfying.  Either the 
theories fail to explain the federal-state taxpayer standing disparity, or they 
are substantially belied in practice.  What could explain the phenomenon, 
then?  One recent scholar took a promising step toward answering this 
question. 
B.  Hershkoff’s State Courts and the “Passive Virtues” 
The Harvard Law Review published Professor Hershkoff’s sweeping 
article, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”:  Rethinking the Judicial 
Function,152 in 2001.  The article explores the similarities and differences in 
federal and state justiciability rules in substantial detail, arguing that any 
inconsistencies can and do—and should—reflect disparities in state and 
federal institutions and the purposes of governance and structure underlying 
them.153  Hershkoff touched upon a number of distinct justiciability 
doctrines in her comprehensive work, including taxpayer and citizen 
lawsuits, moot disputes, political questions, and advisory opinions.154  Her 
piece has been enormously influential to the state constitutional discourse 
over the past decade.155 
Hershkoff dedicated several pages of the article to a discussion of the 
status of public action litigants in state court, including, most notably, state 
taxpayer lawsuits.156  She noted that almost every state allows some degree 
of taxpayer actions, even in the absence of a showing of an increased tax 
burden or particularized injury.157  Hershkoff went on to describe these 
 
 151. See, e.g., City of Greenwood Vill. v. Petitioners for Proposed City of Centennial, 
3 P.3d 427, 436 n.7 (Colo. 2000) (“[S]imilar considerations underlie both Colorado and 
federal standing law, and we frequently consult federal cases . . . .”); Dover Historical Soc’y 
v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 838 A.2d 1103, 1111 (Del. 2003) (federal standing 
standards “are generally the same as the standards for determining standing to bring a case or 
controversy within the courts of Delaware”); ACLU v. City of Albuquerque, 188 P.3d 1222, 
1227 (N.M. 2008) (despite the lack of a state equivalent to the case and controversy 
requirement, “[New Mexico] courts have long been guided by the traditional federal 
standing analysis”). 
 152. Hershkoff, supra note 30.  Hershkoff’s titular quotation, “Passive Virtues,” is a 
reference to Professor Alexander Bickel’s seminal 1961 Harvard Law Review article, The 
Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword:  The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). 
 153. See generally Hershkoff, supra note 30. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Specifically, according to West’s KeyCite service, as of November 16, 2012, ten 
courts—all of them state appellate tribunals—and 124 legal journals or other secondary 
works have cited her article. 
 156. Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1852–59. 
 157. Id. at 1855.  Hershkoff observed that New Mexico’s standing rules properly could be 
seen to permit citizen (and not taxpayer) standing in cases involving an important public 
interest. Id. at 1856 n.123 (citing State v. Johnson, 990 P.2d 1277, 1284 (N.M. 1999)). 
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generally permissive taxpayer standing rules as “for the most part 
uncontroversial.”158 
None of this was particularly new or groundbreaking; commentators have 
offered similar assessments for decades.159  But Hershkoff went one step 
further in her analysis.  She linked the permissive state taxpayer standing 
rules to a feature of state constitutionalism that had not been previously 
suggested.  Hershkoff wrote:  “Because state constitutions include many 
substantive social and economic provisions, taxpayer standing provides an 
important mechanism for regulatory enforcement and policy elaboration, 
sometimes placing interbranch disputes before the court.”160  Her article is 
more specific in a footnote explaining this proposed connection between 
liberal standing rules and substantive state constitutional provisions.  There, 
Hershkoff offered the example of constitutional provisions regulating and 
circumscribing legislative discretion over fiscal matters, citing a 1991 law 
review article discussing state constitutional debt limitations.161 
Hershkoff revisited this idea later in her piece.  In a section addressing 
the applicability of the principles and arguments supporting restrictive 
federal justiciability doctrines, she again suggested that permissive state 
taxpayer standing rules were appropriate in light of certain unique 
characteristics of state constitutionalism.  Hershkoff cited the often-
discussed inclusion of “positive rights and regulatory norms” in state 
constitutions, which she argued “explicitly engage state courts in 
substantive areas that have historically been outside the Article III 
domain.”162  She specifically identified positive right guarantees163 such as 
the provision of free public schools and the regulation of various public 
service entities like corporations, railroads, and banks.164 
The notion that there is a distinct connection between liberal state 
taxpayer standing rules and substantive social and economic state 
 
 158. Id. at 1855. 
 159. See supra Part II.A (discussing commentary on permissive state taxpayer standing 
rules). 
 160. Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1855 (footnotes omitted).  At least one prior 
commentator implicitly acknowledged the correlation between permissive state taxpayer 
standing rules and state constitutional litigation, though she did so summarily and did not 
propose any link between the concepts. See Friesen, supra note 83, at 1302 (calling taxpayer 
suits to enforce state constitutional rights “commonplace”). 
 161. Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1855 n.116 (citing Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. 
Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness:  The Effectiveness of Constitutional 
Debt Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1301). 
 162. Id. at 1889–90. 
 163. “Positive rights” provisions have long been a popular topic among state 
constitutionalists.  See Scott R. Bauries, State Constitutions and Individual Rights:  
Conceptual Convergence in School Finance Litigation, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 301, 316–19 
(2011). See generally Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for Government Work:  The 
Interpretation of Positive Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459 
(2010).  Indeed, Professor Hershkoff has frequently written on the issue. See, e.g., Helen 
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions:  The Limits of Federal Rationality 
Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999). 
 164. See Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1890. 
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constitutional regulatory provisions is undeniably attractive at first blush.  
These constitutional provisions generally are absent at the federal level, and 
therefore, Hershkoff’s suggested link provides a succinct and compelling 
explanation for both the permissive state taxpayer regimes employed in 
most states, as well as the corresponding federal-state disparity. 
Yet certain aspects of the argument do not resonate as well on closer 
inspection.  For example, the implication that permissive state taxpayer 
standing doctrines are necessary or especially well-suited to allow state 
courts to intervene in disputes over positive rights is incomplete at best.  If a 
state or local government is required to do something by the state 
constitution, then it is entirely plausible that an affected individual might 
suffer an actionable injury-in-fact if the state failed to comply with this 
obligation, even under traditional injury-based standing rules.165  Imagine, 
for instance, a state constitutional provision guaranteeing a free public 
education.  That is a classic constitutional positive right, and yet there 
appears to be no reason why a child who is promised this schooling would 
be unable to claim the requisite legal injury if that public service is 
withheld.  Injury-based standing rules seem perfectly sufficient to enforce 
that type of constitutional provision.166 
Nor does the fact that state constitutions sometimes regulate banks or 
railroads or corporations seem particularly relevant to the lenient taxpayer 
standing rules in state court.  Federal law regulates all of those as well, and 
federal courts obviously take an opposite view on the issue of taxpayer 
standing.  Furthermore, it is not hard to imagine that if a state government 
failed to properly enforce or apply one of these substantive regulatory 
provisions, one or more individuals might suffer a necessary injury-in-fact 
to convey standing under traditional justiciability rules.167 
 
 165. See, e.g., Usman, supra note 163, at 1519–20 (“Interpreting positive rights does not 
inherently press the courts into the narrow domain of cases that constitute non-justiciable 
political questions. To the contrary, positive rights, like their negative rights counterparts, 
invite judicial interpretation.”). 
 166. This hypothetical is not novel or unprecedented.  See Lobato v. State, 216 P.3d 29, 
35 (Colo. App. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 218 P.3d 358, 367 (Colo. 2009).  In Lobato, 
the Colorado Court of Appeals held that parents of students had injury-based standing to 
challenge the failure of the state to provide sufficient funds for education in violation of the 
Colorado Constitution’s “positive right” guaranty. Id.  The Colorado Supreme Court did not 
disturb this determination. See Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 363 (Colo. 2009).  
Commentators are in accord with this result. See James E. Ryan, A Constitutional Right to 
Preschool?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 49, 85 (2006) (discussing justiciability of positive right 
education cases); Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty To Support “Public” 
Schools, 48 B.C. L. REV. 909, 966–68 (2007) (same). 
 167. For example, Hershkoff cites the Oklahoma Constitution’s regulation of monopolies 
and its imposition of miner safety standards.  See Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1890 n.300 
(citing OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 44; id. art. VI, § 26).  But if a company was engaging in 
monopolistic business practices, one would expect that its competitors or customers might 
suffer a particularized injury-in-fact sufficient to attempt to compel the Oklahoma 
government to enforce that constitutional provision.  Similarly, if the state government failed 
to enforce miner safety standards, one of the affected miners could claim his or her 
heightened personal risk as a sufficient injury to convey standing.  There may be some 
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Still, it is impossible to deny that Hershkoff’s argument was a thoughtful 
and original idea, and one which can shed a great deal of light on a 
phenomenon that has received surprisingly little attention from 
contemporary scholars.168  It should come as no surprise, then, that several 
judges and commentators have since embraced—mostly uncritically—her 
proposed connection between permissive state taxpayer standing doctrines 
and substantive state constitutional social and economic regulatory 
provisions.169  And in fact, although this link is overbroad to some degree, 
it contains a great deal of truth.  That thesis is the focus of the rest of this 
Article. 
C.  State Constitutional Fiscal Limitations and 
Briffault’s Disfavored Constitution 
One conspicuous omission in the foregoing critique of Professor 
Hershkoff’s article should be readily apparent.  The positive rights and 
detailed regulatory provisions often found in state constitutions may be 
inadequate to explain why state courts generally permit taxpayer lawsuits, 
whereas federal courts do not.  But the same cannot be said about her 
largely unspoken implication that there is some link between permissive 
taxpayer standing rules and state constitutional provisions limiting a state 
government’s discretion over economic or fiscal matters.170  Those very 
specific constitutional restrictions seem particularly apt to trigger the 
enforceability concerns that some courts and commentators associate with 
liberal taxpayer standing doctrines.171  And perhaps just as importantly, 
 
prudential question as to whether the state is the proper defendant in that scenario, of course, 
but this would not implicate a question of injury-based standing. 
 168. Professor Hershkoff responded to these criticisms in our correspondence.  She 
observed that state constitutional provisions like positive rights and regulatory measures 
generally were not actionable at common law, especially in cases involving solely 
nongovernmental litigants, which is an argument that she has fleshed out at length. See 
Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”:  Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional 
Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1541–46 (2010).  Two immediate 
rebuttals come to mind.  First, this Article solely envisions lawsuits against governmental 
entities (and not private litigants) as a method to enforce positive right and regulatory 
constitutional provisions.  Second, as an empirical matter, recent decades have seen a 
number of lawsuits seeking to exercise these types of constitutional provisions that were 
permitted by the state courts. See supra note 166.  In any event, she certainly raises an 
excellent point, and one that warrants future inquiry. 
 169. See Manzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d 656, 673–74 (Mo. 2011) (Wolff, J., concurring) 
(citing Hershkoff for the proposition that “[t]he differences in taxpayer standing cases reflect 
the profound differences between the constitutions under which these courts function”); see 
also Chia & Seo, supra note 147, at 129 (also citing Hershkoff); John C. Reitz, Standing To 
Raise Constitutional Issues, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 437, 460 (Supp. 2002) (favorably quoting 
Hershkoff for the same); DiManno, supra note 48, at 661 (same); Doggett, supra note 83, at 
873–74 n.222 (same). 
 170. See Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1855 n.116, 1889–90 (citing constitutional debt 
restrictions as an example of state constitutional efforts to “constrain state and local fiscal 
authority”). 
 171. Indeed, there is a well-developed literature discussing the problem of standing in the 
context of a specific sort of constitutional fiscal restriction—a balanced budget amendment.  
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these limitations at least nominally are intended to protect the class of 
taxpayers as a whole.172  If the taxpayer-beneficiaries would not have 
standing to challenge violations of these specific fiscal limitations expressly 
designed to protect them, then it is hard to see how anyone else would.  
Perhaps those provisions could explain the difference in federal and state 
taxpayer standing rules. 
A few examples may help to demonstrate this potential dynamic.  To use 
the same specific constitutional fiscal limitation identified by Hershkoff, 
consider a restriction on the issuance of government debt.173  Who would 
be injured if a state government blatantly violated it?  Not the government 
that illegally borrowed the money, and not the debtholders who willingly 
lent it—indeed, the taxpayers and/or citizens of the particular jurisdiction 
would seem to have the most plausible claim of injury, however broad or 
widely disseminated.174  Or imagine a not-uncommon state constitutional 
provision forbidding a state or local government from providing funds to be 
used for abortion services.175  Even if a state agency began directly and 
unabashedly paying providers in connection with every abortion provided 
in the state, it is unlikely that any specific individual would suffer the 
particularized harm necessary to convey standing under an Article III 
analysis.  After all, the only persons even affected by such an action would 
be the beneficiaries of those illicit funds. 
Nor are these sorts of fiscal limitations a minor or inconsequential 
component of state constitutions.  They are littered throughout the 
 
See, e.g., Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1105, 1165–66; Donald B. Tobin, The Balanced Budget Amendment:  Will Judges 
Become Accountants?  A Look at State Experiences, 12 J.L. & POL. 153, 185–88 (1996); Gay 
Aynesworth Crosthwait, Note, Article III Problems in Enforcing the Balanced Budget 
Amendment, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1065, 1073–82 (1983). 
 172. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 908–09 (“[F]ar less attention has been paid to a 
distinctive feature of state constitutions that has little to do with civil liberties or positive 
rights—the many provisions that seek to protect taxpayers by limiting the activities and costs 
of government.”); Phillip J.F. Geheb, Tax Increment Financing Bonds As “Debt” Under 
State Constitutional Debt Limitations, 41 URB. LAW. 725, 732–33 (2009) (characterizing the 
purpose of debt limitations as “protect[ing] the public from the inherent ‘shortsightedness’ of 
legislatures to incur debt without considering the burden on future taxpayers”); see also 
Reuven Mark Bisk, Note, State and Municipal Lease-Purchase Agreements:  A 
Reassessment, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 521, 521–22 (1984) (same).  Academic 
commentators are not alone in this assessment of the purpose behind constitutional fiscal 
restrictions. See Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1, 10 (Me. 1983) (“[T]he taxpayers of 
the state are surely among the principal intended beneficiaries of that [constitutional public 
purpose] provision.”); Dep’t of Ecology v. State Fin. Comm., 804 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Wash. 
1991) (stating the same with respect to debt limitations). 
 173. See Hershkoff, supra note 30, at 1855 n.116. 
 174. But see Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth Amendment 
Style, 33 TULSA L.J. 561, 607 (1997) (suggesting that bondholders might have standing). 
 175. See, e.g., Hotaling v. Hickenlooper, 275 P.3d 723 (Colo. App. 2011) (challenging 
cancer screening grants awarded to abortion providers allegedly in violation of a 
constitutional abortion funding ban).  In the interest of full disclosure, the author was lead 
counsel for the State in this case. 
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constitutional landscape in virtually every state.176  Indeed, a few scholars 
have identified these fiscal restrictions as a main feature distinguishing state 
constitutions from their federal counterpart.177  Professor Briffault is the 
most prominent of them.  His 2003 article, Foreword:  The Disfavored 
Constitution:  State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law,178 closely 
examines the state constitutional fiscal limits that (he argues) are intended 
to protect taxpayers by limiting the activities and costs of government.179  
Briffault identified several such provisions that can be found in most, if not 
virtually all, state constitutions.  These include public purpose 
requirements, which expressly limit the authority of state or local 
governments to transfer public moneys or other financial assistance to 
private enterprises;180 antigift clauses, which prevent a state from lending 
its credit to private individuals or corporations;181 debt limitations, which 
take a variety of forms but generally restrict the ability of state or local 
governments to incur debt;182 and tax and expenditure limitations, which 
broadly restrict the amount of taxes that can be assessed and collected by 
 
 176. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth S. Goldman, Controlling Legislative 
Shortsightedness:  The Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 
1301, 1315–16 (noting that over three-quarters of states have constitutionalized debt 
restrictions). 
 177. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 31, at 908 (“The Federal Constitution says next to 
nothing about public finance, and when it does so, it either provides authority for 
congressional action or sets procedures for raising and spending money.  It places just a 
handful of substantive constraints on federal taxation and no restrictions on federal 
borrowing at all.”); G. Alan Tarr, Subnational Constitutions and Minority Rights:  A 
Perspective on Canadian Provincial Constitutionalism, 40 RUTGERS L.J. 767, 774 (2009) 
(state constitutional fiscal limitations are “without parallel or precedent in the Federal 
Constitution”); see also Susan P. Fino, A Cure Worse than the Disease?  Taxation and 
Finance Provisions in State Constitutions, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 959, 969–70 (2003) (attributing 
the proliferation of constitutional fiscal limitations to easily amendable state constitutions); 
David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2605–07 (2005) 
(discussing state constitutional fiscal regulation).  As discussed below, the absence of 
specific federal constitutional fiscal limits can be overstated. See infra Part V.C. 
 178. See Briffault, supra note 31. 
 179. See id. at 908–09.  Briffault was not the first to suggest that the main goal of state 
constitutional fiscal limitations is to protect state taxpayers as a whole. See, e.g., Note, Legal 
Limitations on Public Inducements to Industrial Location, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 619–23 
(1959). 
 180. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 910–15.  Commentators generally attribute the 
provisions to the “disastrous consequences” of government investment in private enterprises 
in the first half of the nineteenth century, specifically including the Erie Canal debacle, when 
thirteen states defaulted on their debts to some degree. Id. at 910–11. 
 181. Id. at 911–12.  These clauses generally were added to state constitutions during the 
nineteenth century in response to the Panic of 1837, which saw several states lend their 
credit to speculative railroad enterprises and then declare bankruptcy when the projects 
collapsed. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Houpt, Note, Shopping for State Constitutions:  Gift Clauses 
As Obstacles to State Encouragement of Carbon Sequestration, 36 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 359, 
363–64, 381–83 (2011) (discussing the origin of gift clauses). 
 182. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 915–18.  Debt limitations restrict the ability of 
governments to borrow money. See id. at 915–16.  They are more varied than public purpose 
requirements or antigift clauses.  Some prohibit debt outright, some limit it to a dollar figure 
or percentage of the state budget, and some impose supermajority legislative or voter 
approval requirements on the issuance of debt. Id. 
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state and local governments and the particular services on which these 
revenues can be spent.183  Briffault characterized these fiscal restrictions as 
fundamentally defining state constitutionalism as much or even more than 
the more popular positive rights and expansive individual liberties invoked 
by many contemporary state constitutionalists.184 
Yet Briffault was more interested in exploring how these constitutional 
fiscal limitations were enforced and applied in practice.  He called them the 
“disfavored constitution” for two reasons.  Briffault first noted that, as of 
2003, these provisions had not received much attention from scholars who 
generally preferred to focus on higher profile topics.185 
Second, and perhaps more interestingly, Briffault argued that state courts 
have generally disfavored these constitutional fiscal limitations in 
practice.186  He contended that they often construe the fiscal limits as 
narrowly and formalistically as possible in order to avoid constraining state 
and local government discretion.187  Briffault suggested a number of 
explanations for this phenomenon.188  He ultimately concluded that these 
fiscal limitations are a crucial—though little-discussed—aspect of state 
constitutionalism, and the participants in the decades-long discourse over 
state constitutional law might benefit from considering them.189 
Briffault was not the first commentator to examine many of the specific 
state constitutional fiscal limitations central to his piece.190  He was not 
 
 183. Id. at 927–39.  These provisions limit a state’s ability to impose taxes and 
appropriate expenditures.  Like debt restrictions, they can take a variety of forms.  The early 
constitutional limits tended to focus on property taxes, but in the past century, they became 
quite diverse and were expanded to various types of state taxation and spending. Id. at 929–
34. 
 184. Id. at 908–09. 
 185. Id. at 908 & n.8.  Briffault noted that even the most ardent critics of state 
constitutionalism tended to focus on issues involving federal constitutional analogues. Id. at 
908 (citing Gardner, supra note 146, at 780–98); see also Richard C. Schragger, Democracy 
and Debt, 121 YALE L.J. 860, 869–72 (2012) (echoing that conclusion with respect to debt 
and tax limitations). 
 186. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 909–10, 939–44. 
 187. Id.; see also Darien Shanske, The Supreme Court and the New Old Public Finance:  
A New Old Defense of the Court’s Recent Dormant Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 43 
URB. LAW. 659, 703 & n.200 (2011) (citing Briffault for the proposition that state courts 
construe state constitutional fiscal limitations narrowly). 
 188. These explanations include the influence of post–New Deal federal jurisprudence, 
which views such economic matters as political questions; judicial sympathy with the 
purposes behind the government programs at issue; a pervasive view among judges that 
violations of these fiscal restrictions are essentially victimless infractions; and the possibility 
that courts view these limitations as artifacts that do not reflect contemporary political 
reality. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 939–44. 
 189. Id. at 955–57. 
 190. See, e.g., Dale F. Rubin, Constitutional Aid Limitation Provisions and the Public 
Purpose Doctrine, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 143 (1993) [hereinafter Rubin, 
Constitutional Aid Limitation] (discussing limits on the use of public moneys or other assets 
to aid private entities); Dale F. Rubin, Public Purpose in the Northwest:  A Sinkhole of 
Judicial Interpretation—The Case for Alternatives in the Delivery of Public Services and the 
Granting of Subsidies, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 417 (1996) [hereinafter Rubin, Public Purpose] 
(same); Sterk & Goldman, supra note 176, at 1301 (discussing debt limitations); Kristin E. 
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even the first to observe that state courts are often reluctant to enforce 
various types of these provisions.191  His article was, however, perhaps the 
first scholarly work to conceptualize this sprawling web of “Briffaultian” 
fiscal limitations as a pervasive thread of state constitutionalism, which had 
been dismissed or minimized by courts and commentators alike.192  
Scholars have cited it favorably over the past several years, both for the 
proposition that these limitations constitute a distinct strain of state 
constitutionalism, as well as part of a more detailed examination of specific 
types of fiscal restrictions.193 
IV.  STATE CONSTITUTIONAL FISCAL LIMITATIONS AND PERMISSIVE STATE 
TAXPAYER STANDING RULES:  TESTING THE LINK 
Part IV sets forth this Article’s hypothesis:  that there is a link between 
the generally permissive state taxpayer standing rules and the prevalence of 
state constitutional fiscal limitations.  It then presents the results of an 
empirical-historical study intended to evaluate this theory. 
A.  Proposing a Link Between State Constitutional Fiscal Limitations and 
Permissive State Taxpayer Standing Rules 
The juxtaposition of Professor Hershkoff’s discussion of generally 
permissive state taxpayer standing regimes and Professor Briffault’s 
examination of state constitutional fiscal limitations is not intended to be 
subtle.  This Article fundamentally argues that the two concepts are 
inextricably linked, with the latter acting as a direct impetus for the former.  
According to this theory, most of the detailed fiscal limitations frequently 
found in state constitutions—but generally not in their federal 
 
Hickman, Comment, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same:  Interpreting 
the Pennsylvania Uniformity Clause, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1695 (1999) (discussing taxation 
uniformity provisions); Justin J.T. Hughes & Garth B. Rieman, Comment, A New 
Generation of State Tax and Expenditure Limitations, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 269 (1985) 
(discussing government expenditure limitations). 
 191. See, e.g., Rubin, Constitutional Aid Limitation, supra note 190, at 143–45 (observing 
that state courts are reluctant to enforce public purpose requirements); Rubin, Public 
Purpose, supra note 190, at 417–19 (same); Sterk & Goldman, supra note 176, at 1358–60 
(observing that state courts are reluctant to enforce constitutional debt restrictions). 
 192. Professor Robert F. Williams, a leading state constitutional theorist, provided an 
introduction to Briffault’s piece (among others) in the Fifteenth Annual Issue on State 
Constitutional Law in the Rutgers Law Journal. Robert F. Williams, Introduction, 34 
RUTGERS L.J. 905 (2003).  He called the Disfavored Constitution “an exceptionally 
thoughtful consideration of the very important, but relatively low-visibility, fiscal provisions 
in state constitutions. . . .  These fiscal provisions, concerning governmental taxation, 
spending, and borrowing, are among the most important in state constitutions concerning the 
way we govern ourselves.” Id. at 905. 
 193. See, e.g., G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams, Foreword:  Getting from Here to 
There:  Twenty-First Century Mechanisms and Opportunities in State Constitutional Reform, 
36 RUTGERS L.J. 1075, 1111–12 & nn.169–71 (2005); Tarr, supra note 177, at 773–74; see 
also Michael J. McCarthy, Silicon Valley Taxpayers Association:  Local Voters, State 
Propositions, and the Fate of Property Assessments, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1899, 1904 (2009) 
(discussing constitutional fiscal limitations in California). 
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counterpart194—specifically are intended to protect taxpayers from the 
improper or ill-advised use of their funds by the state government.195  Only 
state taxpayers as a whole, and not any particularized individual or group, 
will normally be injured if these Briffaultian restrictions are disregarded or 
violated.  This Article argues that taxpayer standing rules have evolved in 
many jurisdictions to reflect this dynamic by allowing individual taxpayers 
to challenge purported violations of these widespread and specific—but 
otherwise unenforceable—state constitutional fiscal limitations. 
In other words, state courts often face a dilemma.  They can ignore a 
specific and detailed constitutional restriction on government fiscal conduct 
designed to protect a broad but definable class of people, simply because 
these beneficiaries are the undifferentiated class of state taxpayers.  Or they 
can give the Briffaultian limitations judicially enforceable teeth by allowing 
a non-Hohfeldian plaintiff to sue on behalf of this class, despite the 
taxpayer-plaintiff’s lack of traditional injury-based standing.  Neither 
alternative must be especially appealing, but courts must pick one 
nonetheless.  It should not be surprising that state courts often choose the 
latter option.  This Article thus proposes the following hypothesis:  the 
permissive state taxpayer standing rules in place in most states are closely 
linked with ubiquitous state constitutional fiscal restrictions, which would 
be otherwise unenforceable by the very beneficiaries that they are intended 
to protect. 
This all may sound familiar, because it is.  The idea closely tracks the 
rationale for permitting Establishment Clause taxpayer challenges 
announced in Flast.  There, Chief Justice Warren focused narrowly on the 
fact that the Establishment Clause is a clear and specific limitation on 
Congress’s Article I, Section 8 taxing and spending power.196  He rejected 
the proposition that taxpayer standing would exist in the absence of such a 
direct and express spending restriction.197  Yet Warren pointedly declined 
to speculate as to the existence of any other additional specific 
constitutional spending limitations, noting that “[w]hether the Constitution 
contains other specific limitations can be determined only in the context of 
future cases.”198  The Flast majority opinion itself therefore refused to 
answer the question of whether Establishment Clause challenges are a 
special one-time exception to the general federal anti–taxpayer standing 
rules, or whether the principle announced in the case was a doctrine of 
general applicability that could be invoked in the future under a similar set 
 
 194. See Sterk & Goldman, supra note 176, at 1315–16 (cataloguing claims that the U.S. 
Constitution is devoid of fiscal limits). 
 195. See supra note 171 (listing various commentators and courts who describe state 
constitutional fiscal limitations as intended to protect the public). 
 196. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 104–06 (1968). 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 104–05.  For a thorough discussion of the court’s opinion, see Debra L. 
Lowman, A Call for Judicial Restraint:  Federal Taxpayer Grievances Challenging 
Executive Action, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651, 665–67 (2007). 
 1296 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
of circumstances (i.e., a specific and direct spending restriction prohibits a 
particular federal expenditure), however uncommon they might be. 
This last observation raises an interesting point.  Commentators and 
courts understandably portray Flast as being drastically ratcheted back or 
“limited to its facts” over the past several decades; they essentially endorse 
the first of these two possible interpretations of the decision.199  But 
perhaps the second view is the better one.  Perhaps the circumstances in 
which the Flast exception will be applicable are just so rare at the federal 
level that they only occur (or at least, have only occurred so far) in the 
Establishment Clause context.  Or to pose this possibility as a question:  
What if the reason why the Establishment Clause exception to the general 
federal prohibition on taxpayer lawsuits has never been expanded to any 
other specific federal constitutional spending restrictions is only because 
federal courts have not found any?  In that case, at least some substantial 
portion of the purported Flast retrenchment should be attributed not to a 
hostility toward the decision by the courts (though that hostility certainly 
exists), but instead to the fact that these courts have simply answered “no” 
to Warren’s open question.200 
The sprawling landscape of state constitutionalism, and especially 
Briffault’s “disfavored constitution,” provides a wonderful contrast to this 
view of Flast and its aftermath.  As opposed to the U.S. Constitution and its 
infamously scant fiscal restrictions, state constitutions are chock full of such 
undeniably specific and detailed fiscal limitations.201  The post-Flast 
evolution of federal taxpayer standing rules might have been quite different 
if the U.S. Constitution resembled its state counterparts in this regard.  
Federal taxpayers might commonly be permitted to bring lawsuits 
challenging federal expenditures as violating one of these hypothetically 
numerous specific federal constitutional fiscal limitations in that alternate 
universe.  And indeed, that is exactly what this Article postulates has 
happened at the state level.  The widespread “specific constitutional 
limitations imposed upon an exercise of the [government’s] taxing and 
spending power,”202 so crucial to Warren’s Flast analysis, have caused state 
taxpayer standing rules to take very different and more permissive paths 
than did their federal equivalent. 
This argument meshes well with many of the technical restrictions 
applied to taxpayer actions in the various states.  The mainstream 
requirement limiting taxpayer lawsuits to situations in which there is a 
 
 199. See supra Part I.A (discussing post-Flast retrenchment). 
 200. That notion is consistent with the views of post-Flast judges and commentators. See 
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1445 (2011) (quoting Hein for 
the same principle); Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 609 (2007) 
(noting that the Court has “declined to lower the taxpayer standing bar in suits alleging 
violations of any constitutional provision apart from the Establishment Clause”); see also 
13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 24, § 3531.10.1 (same). 
 201. See supra Part III.C (discussing the prevalence of state constitutional fiscal 
limitations). 
 202. Flast, 392 U.S. at 105. 
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sufficient economic nexus between the plaintiff’s taxes and the government 
conduct being challenged—and in some states, even further limiting 
challenges to government expenditures and not revenue collection 
measures—is well-suited to serve as a practical limitation confining 
taxpayer lawsuits to fiscal challenges.203  Similarly, only affirmative 
spending can violate a specific fiscal limitation, which by definition 
restricts government conduct and does not mandate that it undertake or 
perform any affirmative duty.  The common requirement that a taxpayer can 
only enjoin an improper expenditure, and not compel the government to 
take some type of action, therefore serves as an important gatekeeping 
mechanism limiting taxpayer actions to fiscal challenges.204  Finally, the 
relationship between the rule in a few states limiting taxpayer actions to 
constitutional or “substantial” claims and the idea that state taxpayer 
standing doctrines are closely linked with state constitutional fiscal 
restrictions should speak for itself.205 
It is important to emphasize one final point.  This Article’s thesis is not 
created from whole cloth.  The argument that state constitutional fiscal 
limitations are a primary driving force behind these liberal standing 
doctrines is, in one sense, little more than an elaboration on Hershkoff’s 
original idea that state justiciability rules often are linked to substantive 
state constitutional provisions.206  Yet despite that promising hint toward 
the ultimate genesis of the doctrines and Briffault’s contemporaneous 
“disfavored constitution” commentary, no scholar has really examined the 
seemingly promising connection between the two specific concepts.  The 
silence on this score is disappointing.  There are fifty states, and only a little 
less than three-fourths of them clearly employ permissive taxpayer standing 
doctrines.  There is no need to theorize in the abstract about what might or 
might not be responsible for the creation and development of these 
permissive rules; one could simply look at the cases themselves to see what 
 
 203. See supra Part II.C (discussing the rule limiting taxpayer challenges to unlawful 
expenditures). 
 204. See supra Part II.C (discussing the rule confining taxpayer challenges to lawsuits 
seeking to enjoin government expenditures and not to compel affirmative conduct). 
 205. See supra Part II.C (discussing states limiting taxpayer actions to substantial or 
constitutional challenges). 
 206. See supra Part III.B (discussing Hershkoff’s theory).  Furthermore, and as noted 
above, at least one high profile court decision has identified this precise link.  In Common 
Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1 (Me. 1983), the Maine Supreme Court was faced with a taxpayer 
lawsuit attacking an arrangement whereby the city of Bath, Maine, the state of Maine, and a 
major shipping company would finance, build, and operate a ship repair facility. See id. at 5–
6.  The plaintiffs argued that certain aspects of the transaction violated the Maine 
Constitution’s public purpose and credit provisions. See id. at 7–8.  The state and city asked 
the Maine courts to reject the action for lack of standing. See id. at 8.  The Maine Supreme 
Court ultimately disagreed, stating that, “other than a taxpayers’ suit, there is no mechanism 
available [to enforce the constitutional provisions at issue]. . . .  It would conflict with the 
basic theory of American government if two branches of government, the legislative and the 
executive, by acting in concert were able, unchecked, to frustrate the mandates of the state 
constitution.” Id. at 9–10. 
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types of claims are involved in the decisions establishing liberal taxpayer 
standing regimes in various states. 
This Article undertakes just such an inquiry.  It evaluates the foregoing 
thesis linking permissive state taxpayer standing doctrines and 
constitutional fiscal limitations through an empirical-historical survey 
examining the types of claims involved in the early taxpayer standing cases 
in all permissive jurisdictions.  The results and their implications are set 
forth below. 
B.  The Survey 
This Section offers the methodology and typology of the survey used to 
test the Article’s hypothesis and then presents the survey’s results. 
1.  Methodology and Typology 
The task of identifying the decisions leading to the current state taxpayer 
standing doctrine in place in a given state is theoretically straightforward.  
One need only locate a few current state taxpayer standing cases and then 
trace back the decisions they cite (and then the decisions cited by those, and 
so on) until an ascertainable case law establishing the current rule is 
identified.  The reality of the task is far more complicated, however. 
This complexity is due to several reasons.  First, standing rules in many 
states have changed over the past century or more—and sometimes, they 
have changed more than once.207  These changes are also often partial and 
incomplete.  Courts frequently modify, expand, or restrict the rule in effect 
at the time of the decision without reversing it.208  It was not easy to decide 
how to classify each state in light of this dynamic.  Therefore, the survey 
incorporated the following rules:  First, only state taxpayer standing rules 
currently employed in a jurisdiction were included.  If there was an earlier 
taxpayer standing doctrine that subsequently was reversed, the now-
inoperative prior regime was ignored.  If the rules had been only modified 
in the past (i.e., a subsequent decision partially altered existing permissive 
rules), however, then the cases establishing the original rule were included. 
Second, the survey also generally includes only decisions in which 
standing was granted.  It seemed problematic to evaluate the creation and 
development of a permissive state taxpayer standing doctrine through cases 
 
 207. Compare Lee v. Macomb County Bd. of Comm’rs, 629 N.W.2d 900, 907 (Mich. 
2001) (expressly adopting federal Article III standing requirements despite earlier precedent 
to the contrary), with Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 
688 (Mich. 2010) (overruling Lee); see also Wein v. Comptroller, 386 N.E.2d 242, 244–45 
(N.Y. 1979) (noting the shift first to permit taxpayer lawsuits, then to restrict them for 
certain types of claims). 
 208. See Wein, 386 N.E.2d at 245 (upholding common law standing rule but precluding 
certain types of lawsuits where such a prohibition is consistent with the legislative intent of a 
parallel taxpayer standing statute); see also Munger v. State, 689 S.E.2d 230, 239–40 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that recent North Carolina authorities would only permit taxpayer 
standing to challenge a government expenditure and not a discriminatory statue). 
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rejecting standing.  They might only reflect that the claim at issue was not 
the type of challenge generally associated with such doctrines.  There were 
a few instances, however, in which a first progenitor decision in a 
jurisdiction rejected standing in a way that unequivocally established a pro–
taxpayer standing rule in the relevant state.209  One cannot trace the 
evolution of taxpayer standing rules in these jurisdictions without 
considering those decisions; thus, they are included. 
Third, the survey only includes state—and not local—taxpayer standing 
decisions.  That may sound obvious on its face given this Article’s specific 
focus, but the question is more difficult in practice.  State decisions do not 
always distinguish between state and local taxpayer lawsuits when 
addressing the issue of taxpayer standing.210  Given this lack of distinction, 
it is tempting to ignore the constraint limiting the survey to state taxpayer 
lawsuits.  If local taxpayer cases are instrumental and even interchangeable 
in the creation and development of particular state taxpayer standing rules, 
after all, why should they be excluded from the survey?211  The answer is 
that these local taxpayer cases play some role—to varying degrees—in the 
evolution of state taxpayer standing doctrines in many jurisdictions.  It 
would be all but impossible to distinguish the state taxpayer cases that are 
directly or substantially influenced by analogous local precedents from 
those that are only indirectly or incidentally influenced by them.  Rather 
than undertake this unworkable task, the survey applies a bright-line rule 
and includes only the state taxpayer standing jurisprudence itself. 
Those are the basic “ground rules”; now for the methodology.  The 
primary goal of the survey was to locate the first progenitor case in every 
 
 209. See, e.g., McKinney v. Watson, 145 P. 266, 267 (Or. 1915) (rejecting state taxpayer 
standing in the case but holding that such standing will generally exist); Lyon v. Bateman, 
228 P.2d 818, 823–24 (Utah 1951) (holding that state taxpayers should be permitted to 
challenge unlawful expenditures but noting that no such spending had been challenged in the 
instant case); see also In re Biester, 409 A.2d 848, 852–53 (Pa. 1979) (holding that taxpayers 
would have standing to challenge government conduct under certain conditions, but not in 
the instant case).  In addition, in Arneson v. Board of Trustees of the Employees’ Retirement 
System of Georgia, 361 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. 1987), the Georgia Supreme Court held that a state 
taxpayer challenging an ultra vires act on the part of the state government will have standing 
only if the act is, in fact, outside of the power of that agency or officer. See id. at 806–07.  
Because the court essentially tied together the standing and merits determinations, it is hard 
to classify the decision as a “standing” or “no standing” one. 
 210. For example, Texas courts generally have cited Terrell v. Middleton without 
distinguishing between state and local taxpayers. See, e.g., Calvert v. Hull, 475 S.W.2d 907, 
908 (Tex. 1972); City of Austin v. Thompson, 219 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex. 1949); Osborne v. 
Keith, 177 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex. 1944); Hendee v. Dewhurst, 228 S.W.3d 354, 378 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2007); Tex. Indus. Traffic League v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 628 S.W.2d 187, 193 
n.4 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); Lopez v. Ramirez, 558 S.W.2d 954, 958 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); 
First Nat’l Bank of Bellaire v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 551 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1977); Anderson v. Houts, 240 S.W. 647, 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). 
 211. See, e.g., Price v. Commonwealth Transp. Cabinet, 945 S.W.2d 429, 431–32 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1996) (discussing the evolution of Kentucky’s state taxpayer standing regime and 
noting that it evolved largely from local taxpayer decisions); Regan v. Babcock, 247 N.W. 
12, 16 (Minn. 1933) (permitting a state taxpayer lawsuit based solely on local taxpayer 
action precedents). 
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permissive jurisdiction; as discussed below, these initial decisions are the 
most important, both for methodological and practical reasons.  The 
research in a particular state started with a Westlaw “natural language” 
search for [taxpayer standing lawsuit action challenge illegal unlawful 
expenditure].  That usually turned up several recent cases explaining the 
current state taxpayer standing rules in a particular jurisdiction.  The survey 
traced back the cases cited in these recent decisions, and then the cases cited 
in those, and so on, until it identified a manageable handful of the first 
decisions establishing the current taxpayer standing rules.  The survey then 
searched the West headnote “States—Fiscal Management, Public Debt and 
Securities—Rights and Remedies of Taxpayers” (360k168.5 k) in each state 
to confirm that it had not missed the first progenitor decision or any other 
important early cases.  The survey also used a few law review surveys to 
double-check its results.212  Finally, in a few states where this was 
unproductive, it performed a text search for [taxpayer w/40 standing] to 
verify that no cases existed. 
Confirming that the first progenitor decisions in each state had been 
identified generally was not difficult.  The 1960 Yale survey cited most of 
these cases, and the West headnote search uncovered most of the rest.  
Many of the progenitor cases also acknowledged that they were resolving a 
question of first impression.213  Once this first—and most important—
decision was found, locating its most immediate progeny was a 
straightforward task.  One difficult choice was where to draw the line in 
terms of the number of subsequent cases to include; the survey did not 
apply any hard-and-fast rule in this regard.  The general goal was to collect 
three decisions, but this was not always possible.  There were only one or 
two cases in some states, whereas in others, based on the development of 
the caselaw, it seemed appropriate to include four or more.  The judgment 
required to determine how many cases to include for each state obviously 
interjects the potential for bias; as such, this Article posits that the first 
progenitor results are the most replicable and thus meaningful.214 
 
 212. See Chilakamarri, supra note 83, app. A at 271; Comment, Taxpayers’ Suits, supra 
note 23, at 900 n.30; Parsons, supra note 39, at 963 n.87.  These comments were all valuable 
to varying degrees, though each had its drawbacks.  The Yale survey was the most 
comprehensive and accurate, but it is a half century old, so some of the state doctrines have 
changed.  Parson’s comment is also more than twenty-five years old, and it heavily borrows 
from the Yale piece, so it shares many of the same problems.  Finally, the Chilakamarri 
comment, while more recent, commingles state and local taxpayer doctrines. 
 213. See, e.g., Nania v. Borges, 551 A.2d 781, 783 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1988) (observing 
that the question of state taxpayer standing was one of first impression); Fergus v. Russel, 
110 N.E. 130, 135–36 (Ill. 1915) (same); Wertz v. Shane, 249 N.W. 661, 662–63 (Iowa 
1933) (same). 
 214. See, e.g., Joshua G. Urquhart, Younger Abstention and Its Aftermath:  An Empirical 
Perspective, 12 NEV. L.J. 1, 39–40 & nn.261–62 (2011) (discussing this possibility of 
unintended bias).  Essentially, the concern is that one might be tempted to include more 
decisions from states that tend to support the Article’s main hypothesis.  In this regard, in the 
five states in which more than four cases were included, the twenty-seven included decisions 
actually undercut the Article’s thesis. See infra Appendix (showing that in Alabama, 
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The survey then determined whether each included decision involved a 
state constitutional fiscal limitation.  It used Professor Briffault’s definition 
as a starting point to determine whether a constitutional provision was a 
fiscal restriction, and then added in a few additional types of limitations that 
fell within the basic spirit of Briffault’s premise, even if he did not identify 
them by name.215  Several cases involved multiple claims, some of which 
were state constitutional fiscal challenges and some of which were not; the 
survey classified all such cases as involving state constitutional fiscal 
limitations. 
The survey also captured one final piece of information.  In order to 
control for the fact that there were different numbers of cases included for 
various states, it placed each permissive jurisdiction into one of four 
groups:  (1) states in which constitutional fiscal limitations played an 
exclusive role in the evolution of these doctrines (i.e., all early decisions 
involved such challenges); (2) states in which constitutional fiscal 
limitations played a substantial role in the evolution of these doctrines (i.e., 
half or more of the early decisions involved such challenges); (3) states in 
which constitutional fiscal limitations played a modest role in the evolution 
of these doctrines (i.e., a minority of the early decisions involved such 
challenges); and (4) states in which constitutional fiscal limitations played 
no role in the evolution of these doctrines (i.e., no early decisions involved 
such challenges). 
2.  Results 
Thirty-six states clearly permit state taxpayer lawsuits under their current 
standing doctrines, as stated above.  The survey included 122 published and 
unpublished decisions from these jurisdictions, for an average of 3.4 
decisions per state.  A table listing the state-by-state results is included as 
an appendix at the end of this Article. 
 
Connecticut, Illinois, Oregon, and Washington, twelve of the decisions involved Briffaultian 
limitation, thirteen did not, and two were unclear). 
 215. As discussed below, infra Part IV.B.2, government compensation limits were by far 
the most commonly found of these “quasi-Briffaultian” provisions. See, e.g., Griffin v. 
Rhoton, 107 S.W. 380 (Ark. 1907) (challenge to prosecutor salary in excess of constitutional 
salary cap); Leckenby v. Post Printing & Publ’g Co., 176 P. 490 (Colo. 1918) (challenge to a 
Lt. Governor’s expense appropriation on the grounds that it was an unconstitutional salary 
increase); Arneson v. Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of Ga., 361 S.E.2d 805 (Ga. 1987) 
(challenge to a government pension program on the grounds that it was unconstitutional 
retroactive compensation).  Single subject appropriation requirements are another common 
fiscal limitation in the survey that was not explicitly identified by Briffault. See, e.g., Stewart 
v. Stanley, 5 So. 2d 531 (La. 1941) (single subject appropriations challenge to crime 
commission appropriation).  In one state, two cases involved a provision implicating both 
restrictions (i.e., a constitutional provision requiring that salary appropriations be confined to 
a single subject). See Dep’t of Educ. v. Lewis, 416 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1982); Dep’t of Admin. 
v. Horne, 269 So. 2d 659 (Fla. 1972). 
 1302 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
The number of cases in a particular state ranged from one (Maine216 and 
Arizona217) to six (Alabama218 and Connecticut219).  The included cases 
spanned the time period from 1881220 to 2009.221  Looking at only the first 
progenitor state taxpayer standing decision in a particular jurisdiction, those 
cases ranged from 1881 to 1988.222  It was reasonably clear whether the 
particular taxpayer challenge involved a state constitutional fiscal limitation 
in 119 of the survey decisions; in contrast, three cases were so vague in 
their description of the plaintiffs’ claims that the type of challenge being 
brought is unknowable.223  This latter group includes one first progenitor 
case.224 
With respect to the most meaningful group of decisions—the first 
progenitor cases—twenty-five of the thirty-five ascertainable decisions 
(71.4%) involved state constitutional fiscal challenges.  Of the ten first 
progenitor cases that did not involve any Briffaultian fiscal limitations, six 
(17.1%) involved statutory or other nonconstitutional claims and four 
(11.4%) involved state constitutional challenges that were not fiscal in 
nature. 
The aggregate survey results are consistent with this topline finding.  
With respect to the state-by-state categorization metric, which attempts to 
control for the fact that the survey includes different numbers of cases for 
various jurisdictions, state constitutional fiscal limitations played an 
exclusive role in the creation and development of permissive state taxpayer 
 
 216. See Common Cause v. State, 455 A.2d 1 (Me. 1983).  A more recent Maine decision 
addressed the issue of the standing of state sales taxpayers to bring a taxpayer action, but it 
rejected standing. See Collins v. State, 750 A.2d 1257 (Me. 2000). 
 217. See Ethington v. Wright, 189 P.2d 209 (Ariz. 1948).  A more recent Arizona 
decision addressed the issue of state taxpayer standing, but it ultimately rejected standing 
because the plaintiffs were not alleging the unconstitutional or illegal expenditure of 
taxpayer moneys. See Bennett v. Napolitano, 81 P.3d 311, 318 (Ariz. 2003). 
 218. See Zeigler v. Baker, 344 So. 2d 761 (Ala. 1977); Goode v. Tyler, 186 So. 129 (Ala. 
1939); Leedy v. Taylor, 164 So. 820 (Ala. 1935); Abramson v. Hard, 155 So. 590 (Ala. 
1934); Hall v. Blan, 148 So. 601 (Ala. 1933); Turnipseed v. Blan, 148 So. 116 (Ala. 1933). 
 219. See Bingham v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 16 A.3d 865 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2009); Conn. 
Post LP v. State Traffic Comm’n, No. X01CV990160337S, 2000 WL 33983848 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Sep. 22, 2000); Enama v. Weicker, No. CV94-0046563S, 1994 WL 282165 
(Conn. Super. Ct. June 13, 1994); Henry v. Life Haven, No. 329566, 1992 WL 170652 
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 9, 1992); Stanley Works v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, No. 393661, 1991 
WL 204897 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sep. 27, 1991); Nania v. Borges, 551 A.2d 781 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. 1988). 
 220. See Lynn v. Polk, 76 Tenn. 121 (1881).  The Lynn case was a chronological outlier.  
The next earliest decisions were a trio of 1907 cases. See Griffin, 107 S.W. 380; Schley v. 
Lee, 67 A. 252 (Md. 1907); Christmas v. Warfield, 66 A. 491 (Md. 1907). 
 221. See Bingham, 16 A.3d 865. 
 222. The latest first state taxpayer standing decision was Nania, 551 A.2d 781. 
 223. See Leedy, 164 So. 820; Richardson v. Blackburn, 187 A.2d 823 (Del. Ch. 1963); 
Reiter v. Wallgren, 184 P.2d 571 (Wash. 1947).  There also were a few additional cases in 
which the type of state constitutional challenge was not explicitly identified, but based on the 
context, it must have been a fiscal one. See, e.g., Richards v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 67 
N.E.2d 583 (Mass. 1946); Leichter v. Barber, 451 N.Y.S.2d 899 (App. Div. 1982); Lynn, 76 
Tenn. 121 (1881). 
 224. See Reiter, 184 P.2d 571. 
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doctrines in eight jurisdictions (22.2%); a substantial role in fourteen 
jurisdictions (38.9%); a modest role in nine jurisdictions (25.0%); and no 
role in the remaining five jurisdictions (13.9%).  In other words, state 
constitutional fiscal limitations played an exclusive or substantial role in the 
early state taxpayer standing decisions in more than three-fifths—twenty-
two of thirty-six (61.1%)—of the permissive state taxpayer standing 
jurisdictions.225  With respect to the less meaningful unweighted aggregate 
survey results, slightly more than half of the total number of cases included 
in the survey—64 of the 119 ascertainable decisions (53.8%)—involved 
Briffaultian fiscal challenges. 
The cases not involving state constitutional fiscal challenges were 
roughly split evenly between nonfiscal state constitutional challenges and 
nonconstitutional claims.  Thirty of the ascertainable non-Briffaultian cases 
(25.0%) consisted of statutory, ultra vires or other nonconstitutional 
challenges.  Twenty-five of these ascertainable cases (20.8%) involved state 
constitutional claims, but the claims did not implicate any fiscal limitations. 
Finally, two very specific types of state constitutional fiscal limitations 
seemed to play an especially important role in the creation and development 
of state taxpayer standing doctrines in many of the permissive jurisdictions.  
Seventeen decisions involved constitutional challenges based on 
government salary or compensation limits.  This is 14.3 percent of all 
ascertainable survey decisions, and more than a quarter (26.6%) of the 
survey cases involving state constitutional fiscal limitations.  It is an 
understatement to say that state courts seem quite willing to permit state 
taxpayer lawsuits challenging executive or legislative official salaries or 
other government compensation on the grounds that they violate a specific 
state constitutional restriction, at least in the early taxpayer standing cases 
included in the survey. 
It was also fairly common for a court to allow a state taxpayer to 
challenge a government expenditure on the grounds that it violated the 
jurisdiction’s single-subject appropriation restriction.  This type of 
constitutional provision generally requires that any legislative appropriation 
be limited to a single subject, ostensibly to combat various forms of 
legislative misconduct (e.g., attaching unpopular substantive measures to a 
“must pass” budget bill).226  Six decisions included in the survey involved 
such single subject appropriation restrictions.227  Therefore, more than a 
third of the included state constitutional fiscal decisions (twenty-three out 
 
 225. Twenty-two of these twenty-three states include a first-progenitor decision involving 
Briffaultian limitations; the remaining one was unclear. Id. 
 226. See generally Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject Rules and the Legislative Process, 
67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 803 (2006) (discussing single subject appropriation rules); see also 
Ondrea D. Riley, Comment, Annual Federal Deficit Spending:  Sending the Judiciary to the 
Rescue, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 591–92 (1994). 
 227. This is 5.0 percent of all ascertainable survey cases, and 9.2 percent of those that 
involve state constitutional fiscal limitations. 
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of sixty-four) involved either government compensation or single subject 
appropriation restrictions.228 
V.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE SURVEY RESULTS 
The final part of this Article discusses the implications of the survey 
results.  It begins by discussing the degree to which the survey affirms or 
disaffirms the Article’s hypothesis.  It then concludes by considering 
additional implications of the empirical results and suggesting avenues for 
future research. 
A.  The Hypothesis Confirmed . . . 
The most important conclusion to be gleaned from these survey results is 
that this Article’s hypothesized link between permissive state taxpayer 
standing doctrines and state constitutional fiscal limitations appears to exist 
in practice, at least to some degree.  Twenty-five of thirty-five (71.4%) of 
the ascertainable first progenitor cases involved these Briffaultian 
challenges.229  This is highly suggestive of a connection between the two 
doctrines.  There is a wide universe of statutory and constitutional claims 
that could be brought under the guise of a state taxpayer lawsuit in state 
court; indeed, one can find many of them in the decisions included in the 
survey.230  It is difficult to believe that the narrow category of state 
constitutional fiscal restrictions would come up over and over again in the 
first progenitor decisions in so many states absent some connection between 
the two concepts. 
And again, this first progenitor result is almost certainly the most 
meaningful metric.  First, from a methodological standpoint, using only the 
first permissive taxpayer standing case avoids the exercise of judgment in 
determining how many cases to include for each state, which eliminates 
bias and weighting concerns.231  Second, and more conceptually, it is 
entirely predictable that a later state court might latch on to the earlier 
taxpayer standing precedent devised from a progenitor case involving 
Briffaultian limitations, even when the claims before it do not implicate that 
sort of fiscal challenge.  Indeed, this precise scenario—a first progenitor 
case involving a state constitutional fiscal challenge that is followed by 
 
 228. As mentioned above, two Florida decisions involved a single subject appropriation 
requirement specifically applicable to government official salary appropriations. See supra 
note 215.  Although this requirement arguably could be classified as either type of 
restriction, the survey placed it in the government compensation limitation category. 
 229. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 230. See, e.g., Green v. Jones, 261 S.W. 43 (Ark. 1924) (statutory challenge to a convict 
lease-out arrangement); Ahlgren v. Carr, 25 Cal. Rptr. 887 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) 
(statutory challenge to textbook purchase); Nania v. Borges, 551 A.2d 781 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1988) (statutory challenge based on the failure to observe a budgetary reserve requirement); 
Light & Power Constr. Co. v. McConnell, 181 A.2d 86 (Del. Ch. 1962) (statutory challenge 
to a bidding contract); Masson v. Reindollar, 69 A.2d 482 (Md. 1949) (ultra vires challenge 
to a road contract). 
 231. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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subsequent cases not involving those claims—occurred in the included 
survey decisions in six jurisdictions (i.e., nearly a quarter of the states with 
a first progenitor decision involving state constitutional fiscal claims).232 
The robustness of this conclusion is underscored when one looks at the 
aggregate results encompassing all survey cases.  Using the state-by-state 
categories defined above, state constitutional fiscal challenges were an 
exclusive or substantial driving force behind the particular permissive 
taxpayer standing doctrine in nearly two-thirds (61.1%) of the relevant 
jurisdictions.233  Looking at the (less meaningful) unweighted aggregate 
results, more than half (53.8%) of all decisions included in the survey 
where the type of challenge being brought is ascertainable involve 
Briffaultian fiscal limitations.234  This should all lead to one inescapable 
conclusion—there is a distinct and unmistakable connection between state 
constitutional fiscal limitations and permissive state taxpayer standing 
doctrines, at least in the early state taxpayer standing decisions. 
A second important observation is that the survey results undercut any 
theory broadly linking permissive state taxpayer standing doctrines and 
nonfiscal substantive social and economic constitutional regulatory 
provisions, specifically including positive rights and regulatory norms.235  
Relatively few cases in the survey even involved any type of nonfiscal state 
constitutional claims.236  And even among those challenges, very few (if 
any) involve substantive policy provisions or positive rights.237  Therefore, 
insofar as this Article rejects the premise that permissive state taxpayer 
standing doctrines are linked to the broader universe of non-Briffaultian 
substantive economic and social constitutional regulatory provisions, then 
the survey results are consistent with that position. 
 
 232. Texas is a prime example of this phenomenon.  After the initial decision in Terrell v. 
Middleton, 187 S.W. 367, 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916), the subsequent Texas state taxpayer 
standing cases generally do not involve state constitutional fiscal challenges. See, e.g., 
Calvert v. Hull, 475 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1972); Johnson v. Ferguson, 55 S.W.2d 153, 158 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Sherman v. Cage, 279 S.W. 508, 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).  Other 
states in which this pattern occurred include Missouri, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, and Utah. 
 233. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 234. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 235. See supra Part III.B (critiquing this theory). 
 236. In fact, non-Briffaultian constitutional claims are implicated in a minority—twenty-
five of fifty-five—of all remaining survey decisions. See supra Part IV.B.2; infra Appendix.  
Of course, given that this Article was examining taxpayer lawsuits, the fact that there were 
very few nonfiscal constitutional challenges probably should not be surprising. 
 237. For example, several of the state constitutional claims in the survey cases involved 
separation of powers issues. See, e.g., Ethington v. Wright, 189 P.2d 209 (Ariz. 1948) 
(challenge to improper legislative delegation of nonprofit property appraisal duties); 
Greenfield v. Russel, 127 N.E. 102 (Ill. 1920) (challenge to a legislative investigation on 
separation of powers grounds); Okla. Pub. Emps. Ass’n v. Okla. Dep’t of Cent. Servs., 55 
P.3d 1072 (Okla. 2002) (challenge to a delegation of mental health institution management 
duties in violation of the state constitution). 
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B.  . . . but Only to Some Degree 
And yet, it is important not to overstate these conclusions for two 
reasons.  First, the survey findings were far from universal.  The link 
between state constitutional fiscal limitations and permissive state taxpayer 
standing doctrines may be reasonably strong, but it is not uniform by any 
stretch.  A significant minority of survey cases did not involve any state 
constitutional fiscal claims.238  This includes five states—Arizona, 
California, Delaware, Minnesota, and New Jersey—in which none of the 
survey cases involved a state constitutional fiscal challenge.239  Moreover, 
roughly a quarter of the survey decisions (counting all included decisions 
from Delaware and New Jersey), and six of the thirty-five ascertainable first 
progenitor decisions, encompass only statutory or other nonconstitutional 
challenges. 
So just as commentators are inaccurate when they say that “virtually all” 
states permit state taxpayer lawsuits,240 the hard-to-deny connection 
between Briffaultian constitutional fiscal limitations and permissive state 
taxpayer standing doctrines can be mischaracterized as stronger than it 
really is.  Part of the explanation for this may be the possibility, as 
discussed above, that some state courts may have extended existing 
permissive taxpayer standing rules developed from earlier state 
constitutional fiscal challenges to broader types of lawsuits in later cases.241  
Yet even this is largely inconsistent with the fact that the first progenitor 
decisions in ten jurisdictions do not involve any state constitutional fiscal 
claims.242  These nonfiscal progenitor cases show that permissive state 
taxpayer standing doctrines arise outside the state constitutional fiscal 
challenge context in a sizeable minority of jurisdictions.  There must be 
something else to help explain this federal-state taxpayer standing disparity, 
at least in part. 
One tempting response is to simply wave away the federal taxpayer 
standing regime as a unique outlier.  This argument views liberal taxpayer 
 
 238. Specifically, 28.6 percent of ascertainable first progenitor decisions and 46.2 percent 
of all such survey decisions involved exclusively non-Briffaultian claims. See supra Part 
IV.B.2. 
 239. See Ethington, 189 P.2d 209; Stanson v. Mott, 551 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1976); Serrano v. 
Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971); Cal. State Emps. Ass’n v. Williams, 86 Cal. Rptr. 305 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Ahlgren v. Carr, 25 Cal. Rptr. 887 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Kuhn 
Constr. Co. v. State, 366 A.2d 1209 (Del. Ch. 1976); Koffler v. McBride, 283 A.2d 855 
(Del. Ch. 1971); Richardson v. Blackburn, 187 A.2d 823 (Del. Ch. 1963); Light & Power 
Constr. Co. v. McConnell, 181 A.2d 86 (Del. Ch. 1962); McKee v. Likins, 261 N.W.2d 566 
(Minn. 1977); Rockne v. Olson, 254 N.W. 5 (Minn. 1934); Regan v. Babcock, 247 N.W. 12 
(Minn. 1933); Yacenda Food Mgmt. Corp. v. N.J. Highway Auth., 496 A.2d 733 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Warnock Ryan Leasing, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Treasury, Div. of 
Purchase and Prop., 475 A.2d 1270 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984); Essex Cnty. Welfare 
Bd. v. Dep’t of Insts. and Agencies, 371 A.2d 771 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977). 
 240. See supra Part II.B (noting that at least eight states do not permit state taxpayer 
lawsuits). 
 241. See supra note 232. 
 242. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
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standing rules as the default stance for any jurisdiction (state or federal), 
regardless of the claim at issue.  The only important question in evaluating 
the federal-state disparity, then, is why the federal anti–taxpayer standing 
doctrine is so different from the mainstream position exemplified by the 
majority of states—not why the states themselves are so permissive.  But 
this argument is undercut by the eight states that preclude state taxpayer 
actions and perhaps even the six additional jurisdictions in which the state 
taxpayer standing rules are ultimately unclear.243  The restrictiveness of the 
federal taxpayer standing regime may place it alongside a minority of states, 
but that minority does exist.  Put simply, the federal standard is not nearly 
as unique or sui generis as some commentators characterize it.  This 
complex and multifaceted issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
A more fundamental reason why the survey results should be taken with 
a grain of salt, at least with respect to confirming this Article’s hypothesis, 
is that the issue of state taxpayer standing could be disproportionately likely 
to implicate state constitutional fiscal limitations by its very nature.  In 
other words, there may be a distinct correlation between the presence of 
Briffaultian restrictions in state constitutions and permissive state taxpayer 
standing rules in those same states, but that does not necessarily imply 
causation.244 
The obvious mechanism for this correlation is straightforward.  Most 
states require a nexus between a taxpayer-plaintiff and the action being 
challenged.245  This normally means that the plaintiff must be challenging 
an expenditure from a fund into which he or she paid taxes, or at the very 
least, conduct that has the potential to diminish the money held in that 
fund.246  As a result, taxpayer challenges seem largely predestined to 
involve fiscal challenges and, even more specifically, claims that a 
government expenditure or equivalent fiscal conduct violated a specific 
limitation.  Statutory fiscal restrictions can be changed by the legislature 
that authorized the expenditure in question, so they should not play much of 
a role in these lawsuits.  That leaves constitutional fiscal restrictions as the 
most logical culprit to be implicated by the claims usually asserted in state 
taxpayer lawsuits. 
This Article’s hypothesis, therefore, may have the relationship backward.  
Permissive state taxpayer standing doctrines did not evolve because of the 
widespread existence of Briffaultian fiscal limitations; instead, the technical 
requirements applied to most state taxpayer lawsuits essentially act as a 
justiciability filter that disproportionately allows through only those claims 
implicating state constitutional fiscal challenges.  But if that is “all” this 
 
 243. See supra Part II.B (discussing jurisdictions that do not permit state taxpayer 
lawsuits). 
 244. See, e.g., Urquhart, supra note 214, at 49–50 & n.304 (citing authorities 
distinguishing between correlation and causation). 
 245. See supra Part II.C (discussing the required nexus between the challenged 
expenditure and the plaintiff’s taxes). 
 246. See supra Part II.C. 
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Article shows—that state taxpayer standing requirements tend to act to 
restrict such lawsuits to state constitutional fiscal claims—then that seems 
like a noteworthy conclusion in and of itself.247  In any event, the issue of 
causality is an interesting one that is worthy of future inquiry. 
C.  The Importance of the Prevalence of State 
Constitutional Fiscal Limitations 
There is another important point to make about the apparent relationship 
between state constitutional fiscal limitations and permissive state taxpayer 
standing doctrines.  It ultimately is unlikely that these spending restrictions, 
viewed singularly in isolation, are solely responsible for the creation and 
development of the relevant taxpayer standing rules.  State constitutions 
undeniably are much more concerned than their federal counterpart with 
limiting the federal government’s discretion over fiscal matters.  But 
commentators can exaggerate the purported dearth of such fiscal limitations 
in the U.S. Constitution.248  There certainly are much fewer of these 
Briffaultian restrictions in the federal constitution, but they are not totally 
absent.  The Establishment Clause is only one.249 
The Twenty-Seventh Amendment, for example, requires that any change 
in congressional salaries can only take effect after the next biennial 
election.250  The provision should call to mind the state constitutional 
compensation limits that play a central role in the early state taxpayer 
standing cases in so many jurisdictions.251  Furthermore, the army 
appropriations clause in Article I, Section 8 expressly prevents Congress 
from appropriating army-related funds for a time period longer than two 
years—clearly another type of specific and direct spending limitation.252  
Both of these provisions provide narrow and concrete restrictions on the 
fiscal conduct of the government in a way that is similar to the state 
constitutional fiscal limitations central to this Article’s thesis.  But despite 
their Briffaultian nature, the Supreme Court has never interpreted either of 
these provisions to convey standing to a taxpayer challenging a purportedly 
illegal federal government expenditure.253 
 
 247. I am grateful to Professor William Hubbard for putting this point so eloquently in 
our correspondence. 
 248. See supra note 177 (cataloguing commentators who assert that the U.S. Constitution 
generally does not restrict fiscal conduct). 
 249. See supra Part I.A (discussing the Flast retrenchment). 
 250. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII. 
 251. See supra Part IV.B.2 (noting that government compensation limits and single 
subject appropriation requirements are implicated in a disproportionate number of cases). 
 252. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 253. Notwithstanding this silence, a few lower courts have passed on both of these 
questions.  Early decisions generally permit taxpayer standing to challenge an appropriation 
purportedly violating U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. See, e.g., W. Mining Council v. Watt, 
643 F.2d 618, 630–33 (9th Cir. 1981) (allowing taxpayer challenge based on army 
appropriations clause); Katcoff v. Marsh, 582 F. Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), modified, 755 
F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985) (same); see also 13B WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 24, 
§ 3531.10.1 (noting that Western Mining Council granted taxpayer standing to bring an army 
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That observation admittedly undercuts this Article’s hypothesis, at least 
to some degree.  If constitutional fiscal restrictions necessarily or inevitably 
result in the creation of permissive state taxpayer standing doctrines so as to 
avoid their otherwise unenforceability, then one would expect to see a well-
developed line of federal cases permitting taxpayer challenges to 
expenditures that arguably violate one of these provisions.  This is 
especially true in light of Flast’s Establishment Clause holding.  The Court 
obviously knows how to create exceptions to the general federal anti–
taxpayer standing rule when confronted with a specific and direct spending 
restriction.254  And yet it has not with respect to these two similarly-
purposed constitutional fiscal limitations.  So why are state constitutional 
fiscal restrictions so prone to lead to permissive taxpayer standing rules, but 
their federal equivalents are not? 
The first obvious answer is that just as state courts often devise 
permissive state taxpayer standing rules from cases involving constitutional 
fiscal limitations and then extend them outside of that context,255 federal 
courts may have created the federal anti–taxpayer standing doctrine from 
disputes unrelated to any constitutional spending limits and then 
subsequently applied that principle in cases involving such fiscal 
restrictions.  In other words, the default rules at both the federal and state 
levels control, even under circumstances that are quite different from those 
that led to their creation in the first place.  But this observation merely 
raises two interrelated questions.  What is the ultimate origin of these 
default rules?  And why are they adhered to so strongly, even when the case 
at hand does not implicate the same concerns on which they were based? 
These more subtle and far-reaching questions are probably best answered 
by Professor Briffault’s insight about fiscal restrictions and the fundamental 
nature of state constitutionalism.  State constitutions are not merely 
subordinate versions of the federal constitution with lots of quirky ad hoc 
fiscal limitations thrown in.  To the contrary, Briffault argues, ubiquitous 
fiscal restrictions make state constitutions an intrinsically different creature 
from their federal counterpart.  Their prevalence, specificity, and unique 
focus on protecting taxpayers from improper fiscal conduct fundamentally 
define state constitutionalism in a way that is distinct from the U.S. 
Constitution.256 
 
appropriations clause challenge).  All of these decisions predate the Court’s more recent 
efforts to narrow Flast, so it is questionable whether courts would reach the same result 
today.  With respect to the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, lower courts have unanimously 
rejected claims of taxpayer standing. See, e.g., Schaffer v. Clinton, 240 F.3d 878, 881 (10th 
Cir. 2001).  Individual congressmen may have nontaxpayer standing where a salary change 
actually affects them, however. See Boehner v. Anderson, 30 F.3d 156, 160–61 (D.C. Cir. 
1994). 
 254. See supra Parts I.A, IV.A (discussing Flast rationale). 
 255. See supra Part V.B & note 232 (discussing the states that fit this pattern). 
 256. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 31, at 909 (“Fiscal limits, as well as positive rights, 
thus characterize state constitutional law.”); see also Williams, supra note 192, at 905. 
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Therein lies one plausible explanation.  A court can ignore an uncommon 
or one-off constitutional fiscal protection as a “political question” or 
similarly nonjusticiable issue with little or no long-term institutional 
consequences.257  The plaintiff invoking this provision will be disappointed, 
to be sure, but as long as the scenario does not seem likely to repeat itself 
over and over again, the isolated unenforceability of the specific fiscal 
restriction will be tolerable.  Things change when a constitution is riddled 
with so many of these limitations that they assume the identity of a distinct 
and identifiable constitutional thread.  It then is much more difficult for a 
court to refuse to enforce the restrictions for a lack of standing.  That court 
faces a troublesome choice.  It must choose whether to (1) allow the 
plaintiffs to proceed despite the lack of traditional injury-based standing, 
(2) distinguish the constitutional fiscal limitation in question from the 
similar provisions that are interspersed throughout the constitution, or 
(3) ignore a pervasive constitutional theme. 
This may be the reason that the isolated fiscal limitations in the U.S. 
Constitution have not led to the same widespread embrace of taxpayer 
lawsuits that has occurred at the state level.  There just are not enough of 
them.  Federal courts generally decline to consider challenges predicated on 
(for example) the Twenty-Seventh Amendment on standing grounds 
because doing so has so few ramifications on any other types of substantive 
federal constitutional provisions or overarching themes (e.g., separation of 
powers, federalism, due process).258  State courts, in contrast, refuse to 
ignore the myriad of Briffaultian fiscal restrictions that are interspersed 
throughout state constitutions because that would be a much more difficult 
and consequential task.  These courts essentially would be deleting an 
omnipresent and crucial thread of state constitutionalism, which they 
understandably are reluctant to do.  Constitutional fiscal limitations 
therefore might only drive the creation of permissive taxpayer standing 
doctrines once they reach a critical mass.  Before that, and they can be 
“written out” of a constitution with little long term institutional cost to the 
courts; after, and they cannot be ignored. 
D.  Permissive Taxpayer Standing Rules:  An Exception to Briffault’s 
“Disfavored Constitution”? 
There is one final point to make.  Professor Briffault’s “disfavored 
constitution” may be a plausible explanation for the federal-state taxpayer 
standing disparity, but that does not mean it is fully consistent with this 
Article’s thesis.  Indeed, the idea that constitutional fiscal limitations are a 
major impetus for the creation and development of permissive state 
 
 257. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 152–53 (6th ed. 2012) 
(noting that the federal standards for determining what is or is not a nonjusticiable political 
question are largely ad hoc and “useless”); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the 
“Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1045 (1985); Louis Michael Seidman, The 
Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 441, 442–43 (2003). 
 258. See Schaffer, 240 F.3d at 881. 
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taxpayer standing rules actually undercuts Briffault’s argument in one 
important way. 
This inconsistency traces to one of the dual meanings in the term 
“disfavored constitution.”  As explained above, Briffault used it as 
shorthand for the general inclination of many courts to minimize or even 
disregard state constitutional fiscal restrictions.259  This judicial hostility to 
Briffaultian limitations in one sense conflicts with this Article’s argument 
that state courts generally permit taxpayers to challenge violations of those 
provisions, even when traditional standing rules would preclude the claim.  
If fiscal limitations are such a fundamental thread of state constitutionalism 
that they compel courts to relax traditional injury-based standing rules, then 
why do these same state courts give the restrictions short shrift on the 
merits? 
This seeming contradiction is only underscored by the suspicion that 
dismissing a lawsuit on justiciability grounds is an easy way to avoid 
reaching the merits of a difficult and disfavored constitutional fiscal 
challenge while still resolving the case.260  A judge need not undertake the 
often controversial and complicated task of slapping down a putative—and 
largely victimless—economic overreach by the legislative or executive 
branches if he or she simply can reject a lawsuit on standing grounds 
because it is brought by an undifferentiated taxpayer.261  Yet courts seem 
especially unlikely to rely on injury-based standing limits in that scenario if 
this Article’s thesis is correct. 
Perhaps the best thing to say about this apparent inconsistency is that one 
should not make too much of it.  This Article did not attempt to determine 
whether the taxpayer-plaintiff ultimately was successful in the included 
permissive taxpayer standing cases involving constitutional fiscal 
limitations.  It is entirely possible that courts interpreted the provisions at 
issue narrowly on their merits in those cases, which would be consistent 
with Briffault’s “disfavored constitution.”  Furthermore, Briffault’s 
argument that courts tend to minimize or ignore constitutional fiscal 
limitations on their merits does not purport to be an empirical one.  It is 
conceivable that a more rigorous inquiry (if one could be devised) might 
disprove or qualify his thesis. 
 
 259. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 909–10, 939–44 (discussing the reluctance of state 
courts to enforce constitutional fiscal limits); see also supra note 194 and accompanying text 
(cataloguing additional commentary noting this reluctance). 
 260. This suspicion is shared by courts and commentators alike.  See, e.g., Elk Grove 
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 18 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The 
Court today erects a novel prudential standing principle in order to avoid reaching the merits 
of the constitutional claim.”); Winter, supra note 47, at 1373 (“[T]he doctrine of standing is 
either a judicial mask for the exercise of prudence to avoid decisionmaking or a sophisticated 
manipulation for the sub rosa decision of cases on their merits.”). 
 261. For example, resolving a constitutional fiscal challenge can require the court to 
weigh and reconcile competing fiscal and nonfiscal constitutional provisions.  See, e.g., 
Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003) (balancing educational funding and 
tax-increase voting requirements); see also Briffault, supra note 31, at 951–52 (discussing 
Guinn). 
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More substantively, there is a general temporal difference between the 
cases included in the survey, which largely date to the first half of the 
twentieth century, and the authorities relied on by Briffault, which are of 
much more recent vintage.262  Briffault’s “disfavored constitution” 
therefore might be a much more recent phenomenon that largely postdates 
the earlier emergence of permissive taxpayer standing rules.263 
And finally, there is a mundane explanation for any seeming 
contradiction.  Two types of fiscal limitations involved in many of the 
survey cases—government compensation and single subject appropriation 
limits—were not specifically addressed by Briffault.264  State court hostility 
to Briffaultian limitations might not extend to those specific types of 
provisions.265  Perhaps they are not subject to a more narrow construction 
as are many of the restrictions explicitly identified by Briffault.  In any 
event, more work must be done in this regard. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s fundamental thesis is quite simple:  Most states permit 
taxpayer lawsuits because their state constitutions are littered with—and to 
some degree, defined by—a myriad of constitutional fiscal restrictions that 
would be unenforceable unless the intended taxpayer-beneficiaries266 could 
sue to invoke them.  So state courts allow state taxpayer actions in order to 
give meaning to this important thread of state constitutionalism.  This is a 
novel theory.  A number of scholars have examined the issue of permissive 
state taxpayer standing doctrines over the past half century,267 but no one 
has proposed a link between liberal state taxpayer standing rules and 
constitutional fiscal limitations.  And yet, a simple empirical-historical 
survey of early state taxpayer standing decisions in all permissive 
jurisdictions suggests that there is some degree of truth to it. 
But it is important to emphasize that—as is so often the case with issues 
of state law—there is substantial variance among the jurisdictions, and it 
would be wrong to view the creation and development of state taxpayer 
standing doctrines as a monolithic or homogenous process.  It is hard to 
dispute the connection between state constitutional fiscal limitations and 
liberal state taxpayer standing doctrines, but the link is by no means 
uniform or universal.  That suggests that this Article’s argument—while 
certainly novel—is at best incomplete, and more research is necessary to 
understand the ultimate impetus behind permissive state taxpayer standing 
 
 262. See supra Part IV.B.2 (summarizing the dates of the included cases). 
 263. I am grateful to Professor Briffault for suggesting this theory to me in our 
correspondence.  Professors Hershkoff and Hubbard concurred with his observation. 
 264. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the prevalence of these two provisions in the 
survey cases). 
 265. See Briffault, supra note 31, at 910–18. 
 266. See supra Part III.C (discussing the purpose behind state constitutional fiscal 
limitations). 
 267. See supra Parts II.A, III.A (discussing views on permissive state taxpayer standing 
doctrines). 
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regimes.  That work remains for a future project.  This Article only aspires 
to introduce a new and potentially promising theory into the academic 
discourse.  Hopefully it has succeeded. 
 APPENDIX 
State No. PC CFL NF NC Uncl. GC SS Cat. 
AL 6 Y 4 0 1 1 2 0 S 
AZ 1 Nc 1 0 0 0 0 0 N 
AK 3 Y 2 1 0 0 0 0 S 
AR 4 Y 2 1 1 0 1 1 S 
CA 4 Ns 0 2 2 0 0 0 N 
CO 3 Y 2 1 0 0 1 1 S 
CT 6 Ns 0 0 6 0 0 0 N 
DE 4 Ns 1 0 2 1 0 1 M 
FL 4 Y 2 2 0 0 2 0 M 
GA 3 Y 2 1 0 0 1 0 S 
HI        
ID        
IL 5 Y 2 3 0 0 2 0 M 
IN        
IA 4 Y 2 1 1 0 1 0 S 
KS        
KY 3 Y 3 0 0 0 0 0 E 
LA 3 Y 2 1 0 0 0 1 S 
ME 1 Y 1 0 0 0 0 0 E 
MD 4 Nc 1 2 1 0 0 0 M 
MA 3 Y 3 0 0 0 0 0 E 
MI        
MN 3 Ns 0 1 2 0 0 0 N 
MS 2 Y 2 0 0 0 1 0 E 
MO 3 Y 1 0 2 0 0 0 M 
MT 4 Y 3 1 0 0 0 0 S 
NE 3 Y 3 0 0 0 0 1 E 
NV        
NH        
NJ 3 Ns 0 0 3 0 0 0 N 
NM        
NY 3 Y 3 0 0 0 1 0 E 
NC 3 Ns 1 0 2 0 0 1 M 
ND 2 Y 2 0 0 0 0 0 E 
OH        
OK 3 Y 2 1 0 0 0 0 S 
OR 5 Y 4 0 1 0 2 0 S 
PA 3 Nc 1 2 0 0 1 0 M 
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RI        
SC        
SD 4 Y 3 1 0 0 0 0 S 
TN 2 Y 1 0 1 0 0 0 S 
TX 4 Y 1 0 3 0 1 0 M 
UT 3 Nc 1 1 1 0 0 0 M 
VT        
VA        
WA 5 U 2 1 1 1 0 0 S 
WV 3 Y 2 1 0 0 1 0 S 
WI 3 Y 3 0 0 0 1 0 E 
WY        
Total 122 
25Y 
10N 
1U 
64 25 30 3 17 6 
8E 
14S 
9M 
5N 
Legend:  PC:  First progenitor case involves constitutional fiscal 
limitations; CFL:  Cases involving state constitutional fiscal limitations; 
NF:  Cases involving nonfiscal constitutional challenges; NC:  Cases 
involving nonconstitutional challenges; Uncl.:  Cases with unknown an 
challenge; GC:  Cases involving government compensation challenges; SS:  
Cases involving single subject appropriation challenges; Cat.:  Category; 
Nc:  First progenitor case involves nonfiscal constitutional challenge; Ns:  
First progenitor case involves nonconstitutional challenge; U:  First 
progenitor case involves unknown challenge; E:  All cases involve state 
constitutional fiscal challenges; S:  Majority of cases involve state 
constitutional fiscal challenges; M:  Minority of cases involve state 
constitutional fiscal challenges; Y:  Yes; N:  No cases involve state 
constitutional fiscal challenges. 
